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I NTRODUCT I OKT
In the 1960's and seventies world shipping underwent a 
period of near unlimited growth. New maritime nations 
emerged and existing ones grew. Tonnage shifted between 
hemispheres and when all this activity finally settled a 
number of side effects were left. One of the most damaging 
side effects of this spur of activity in the shipping 
industry was that of marine pollution and marine casualties 
involving loss of life. Numerous international conventions 
dictating the responsibities of flag states in maritime law 
applications were in force. However, these conventions had 
not tackled the problems of marine pollution and safety of 
life adequately.
The development of the concept of port state control 
occurred at the time when world shipping, particularly the 
oil transport trade was at its lowest social regard. This 
study will trace^„the historical development of port state 
control, identify current applications and problems, and 
propose the regionalization of Port State Control 
enforement under the auspices of the IMO.
A. The Historical Development of Port State Control.
In 1967, the world was shocked when the TORREY CANYON 
spilled 100,000 tons of oil into the sea.^ The world 
governments came together and two years later in 1969, 
signed the International Convention on Civil Liability For 
Oil Pollution Damage. This Convention only sought to make 
amends for disasters, not to correct them. Consequently, on 
March 17, 1978, the world was shocked again when the 223,680 
DWT AMOCO CADIZ spilled 230,000 tons of oil off the coast of
^ Carlisle, R., Sovereignty for Sale. Annapolis, Naval 
Inst. Press, 1981, at 176.
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Brittany, thereby polluting some 400 kilometers of 
coastline. *•
The total economic loss as a result of the AMOCO CADIZ 
disaster vas estimated at about 290 million US Dollars in 
1978. This amount is divided into several parts: <a) the
loss of the vessel and cargo, loss of recreational 
amenities, legal and research costs, and damage to human 
health; (b) emergency response, cleanup and environmental 
restoration costs, loss of non-commercial bio-mass and 
seabirds, loss of income for tourist industry, loss of 
personal property, etc and (c) reduced income for local 
government. secondary effects of reduced outputs in various 
industries, and compensation paid by the national government to claiments for costs and loses incurred. ^ There is
no doubt that such massive spills have an even greater 
impact on the entire world. Consequently, it is not 
surprising to see remedial action taken by world bodies, 
such as the IMO, to avert subsequent occurances in the 
future.
Another most damaging side effect of the flurry of 
activity in the industry regards loss of life at sea. Loss 
of life has always been a concern in shipping. This is 
quantified by ^the fact that governments signed an
International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea as far
back as 1948. The problem of loss of life or safety of life 
in general is one deeply rooted in the maritime tradition of 
all established maritime nations. It is a problem which has 
always cut across flags and, as a result all maritime 
nations have to bear some responsibility for alleviating
this problem. But in order to take action, the scope of the
problem must be first identified.
^ Dewar, M. D., Collisions at Sea - How. Glasgow, 
Brown, Ferguson & Son, 1989, at 148. See also, Metaxis, B. N. Flags of Convenience, Gower Publishing Co., Hants, 1985, at 98.
^ Metaxis, at 98-99.
2
B. The Concept of the Substandard Ship.
The maritine industry, like most others, is not a 
homogeneous socially responsible industry. It is a diverse 
and capital intensive, profit oriented industry, which 
means, the highest priority has been given to making a 
profit at some risk. Ships of varying ages and sizes are 
maintained according to different standards by very 
different owners and operators. Even the national
legislations of the over one hundred flag states often vary 
widely in terms of interpretation and enforcement of safety 
standards. In the last few years, much effort has been put 
into enforcing international. regulations regarding 
construction, equipment and manning standards in the fight 
against oil pollution damage and safety of life.^
The failure of ships to meet required safety standards 
render the ship substandard. Substandardness can sometimes 
be construed in terms of seaworthiness. In maritime law, 
seaworthiness has been defined as the "degree of fitness 
which an ordinary, careful and prudent owner would require 
his vessel to have at the commencement of her voyage, having 
regard to all the probable circumstances of it. "^ Basically, 
a ship must be in good repair as to hull, tackle and 
machinery and sufficiently fueled, ballasted and manned by 
efficient crew. ^ To achieve this end, several 
internationally recognized minimum standards have been
developed and enforced by various maritime states through 
conventions and spe.cial agreements . to achieve global 
uniformity. A ship is substandard if it fails to meet these 
minimum standards.
The term "substandard ship" should not be confused with 
"open registry" or "flag of convenience" ship .because the 
flag does not make the ship. Some studies have been
^ Lowe, A. V., A Move Against Substandard Shipping. 6 
Marine Policy 326 (Oct 1982).
^ McFadden v. Blue Star Line, 1 K.B. 697 (1905), at
706.
6 Chorleys & Giles. Shipping Law. 6th ed. London, Pitman Publishing, 1987.
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conducted on identifying potential polluters and 
criteria such as flag^ aoe anH ci-yo have been used in theanalysis. ^ Of the three, the most commonly connected 
criteria is that of the flag. Unfortunately, the flag is the 
variable factor in the interpretation of the statistical 
information derived. The reason is simple. Vessels do not 
necessarily remain in the same register throughout their 
service life. If in any significant percentage of the 
cases, the culprit or culprits change flag, this would 
obstruct the accuracy of the -information. The size of the 
vessel though a constant, can be misleading as well. A 
poorly managed VLCC is probably just as likely to cause 
marine pollution as a poorly maintained feeder tanker. The 
difference lies in the potential extent of the pollution 
damage that could be caused. The age of a vessel, also a 
constant, is by far the singularly most accurate measure of 
any likelihood of pollution. Old ships, like any old piece 
of machinery require constant and careful maintenance in 
order to perform properly. The older the vessel, the more 
accident prone it is. This does not go to say new vessels 
do not cause pollution damage. Indeed some of the major oil 
spills in the last few years have been caused by relatively
Pnew tankers.” This is usually due to human error.
As was stated earlier, one of the criteria for seaworthiness 
is proper mannings A duly qualified crew is essential for 
the safe navigation of any vessel. In those casualties 
involving human error, the judgment calls of the master or 
others immediately responsible simply turned out to be 
erroneous. If the crew is unqualified with regard to all 
the circumstances of the voyage the ship is substandard. 
However, it cannot be concluded that a ship is made 
substandard by the wrong judgment of the master or crew. It 
must follow then, that in cases like the AMOCO CADIZ and 
E30CON VALDEZ the issue is not that of substandard but rather 
variable of function.
Tintz, M. A. Port State Control versus Marine Environmental Pollution, 16 Maritime Pol. Mgmt 189 (1969) at 190.
8 AMOCO CADIZ was a five year tanker at the time ofits loss. The EIXXON VALDEZ was two years old.
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Table I
Mean fleet a^e for selected (lags 1984.
Rag Dra/.il 1 "ranee Norway Denmark
West
Germany Sweden Spain Liberia World
Mc:in 90 9-3 7-4 80 6-4 8-1 93 9-8 12 1
age
r
Mean age of losses, 1975-1985.
Year Mean age Year Mean age
1975 16-3 1981 18-6
1976 18-5 1982 18-5
1977 200 1983 18-4
1978 19-4 * 1984 18-3
1979 193 1985 18-4
1980 18-6 1986 n.a.
In any event, statistics have shown that there are 
thousands of vessels plying the high seas which are either 
substandard or have potentially serious deficencies which 
would render the vessels substandard. The effort to
eliminate substandard ships has taken several forms. There 
are individual remedial and punitive actions, as well as 
collective actions in the form of conventions and port state 
control cooperative efforts. Both systems will be analyzed 
inf ra.
The elimination of substandard-ships is a desirable 
goal for everyone, but the enforement of the new minimum 
standards is not very ‘ easy. Ordinarily,
responsibility for enforcing the rules lie with the flag 
state. However, it is often near impossible for the flag 
state to fully ensure that all its vessels comply with the 
international standards. Open registries have often been 
singled out in this regard because most vessels flying the 
flag of these states rarely call at the home port.
The more accurate explanation is that most registries with 
large viable fleets have ships which will not call at the 
home port. Thus, the problem with enforcement of standards 
does not lie in a lack of a genuine link or inadequate 
inspectorate, it lies in the ever changing movement pattern 
of ships. No inspectorate, however large and efficient can 
fully enforce standards. This is evidenced by the loss 
ratio of the Paris Memorandum of Understanding member 
states, which was worse than the world's average for 1986. 
This analysis is not meant to defend open registries with 
less than admirable safety standards. It is an attempt to 
focus on the non-political, non-economic, non-antagonistic 
factors surrounding sub standard ships, and the need to 
eliminate them.
In Europe, three pivotal groups, shipowners, 
politicians and the electorate recognized the need to 
eliminate substandard ships from European ports. These
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1968-1985; Monthly Shipping Statistics, May 1987 for the year 1986 [51].






GRT lost X 100
GRT registered
1968 263-391 86943 030
1969 382-044 92 311 0-41
1970 21.3-831 98123 022
1971 ^ 429-279 107 231 0-40
1972 ‘ 201-145 114 357 018
1973 246-780 121 765 020
1974 314-969 129617. , ■ 024
1975 300-002 139098 ^ ■ 022
1976 229-644 147373 016
1977 .307-659 151655 020
1978 905-175 154 965 058
1979 696932 149237 047
1980 667-356 149147 045
1981 521-176 147 593 035
1982 450801 142070 032
1983 608-720 129815 047
1984 677-153 II5447 059
1985 375-159 98010 038
1986 416100 90717 046
N.B. For the years 1968-197.1 and 1976-1980 inclusive, no loss data were available for IRL. Therfore 
GRT lost and GRT registered for these years are exclusi\‘e ofl R L The data have been obtaii^ from Lloyd’s 
Statistical Tables and Uo)d's Annual Casualty Returns for the years 1968-1985; Monthly Shipping Statistics, 
May 1987 for the year 1986.
groups recognized that a collective effort was needed in 
view of the above consideration and identified the following 
motivating factors for immediate implementation:
(a) economic pressure on the European shipping 
community from more efficient or cheaper 
competitors;
<b> growing awareness of the detrimental economic 
and political effects of environmental 
pollution in industrialized countries of 
Europe;
<c) globalization of commerce and industry, which
has intensified and thus forced politics to
12internationalize too.
An independent assessment of the above factors lead 
to some rather interesting hypotheses regarding the lucid 
movement by the European.^tates toward a concerted effort to 
enforce international safety standards. The economic
pressure on the European shipping community can be 
attributed to the comparative cost advantage of flagging 
out, over tonnaging and protectionism. The comparative 
advantage of flagging out lies in the lower crew costs and 
minimal or no taxation and minimum regulation. It is now 
well documented that crew from third world countries such as 
the Philipines and Ghana cost far less than crew from 
Western European countries, both in terms of actual wages 
and benefits. The most attractive aspect of such crew lies 
in the strength of labor organizations. Labor unions in the 
west are more organized and can pool greater collective 
bargaining strength than their third world counterparts. 
Flagging out gives the shipowner the opportunity to slash 
his operating costs and avoid confrontation with powerful 
unions at the same time. Similarly, by flagging out the 
owner can avoid high taxes and undue commercial regulation
Tintz, at 191.
Mitchell, D., The Future of Shipping-The Challenge of Change, Money and Ships in the City, Seatrade Conference, Barbican Centre, March 20-22, 1985, at 6-7.
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virtually all aspects of shipping, particularly safety. 
The lack of serious competition for many years has led to a 
complacency in European shipping. Suddenly faced with a 
major crisis, the European shipowners, unlike the market 
oriented Americans, failed to see that shipping today is not 
so much about "cost-effiency without sacrificing safety or 
quality" but rather "the ability to manage, market and 
finance" that will determine whether a company can survive 
this market.
Another burden faced by the Ekiropean shipowners was the 
"greening" of Europe. Following numerous incidents of 
environmental pollution, both land and sea-based, industries 
in Europe became increasingly aware of the detrimental 
economic and political effects of environmental pollution. 
Green organizations launched impressive anti-pollution 
campaigns, states passed numerous anti-pollution 
legislations and the- electorate preferred environmentally 
conscious candidates for political office. One of the 
industries hit hard by this new anti-pollution fervor was 
the shipping industry. Shipowners were forced, by new
safety regulations to employ expensive safety and anti­
pollution measures which drove their operation costs higher. 
As indicated earlier, humam error accounts for a majority of 
the large scaler marine pollution; here too, technical 
solutions were found to correct human error.
The third motivation for implementing port state 
control was the intensification of globalized commerce and 
industry, and the resulting internationalization of 
politics. Here again, the European shipowner was ill- 
prepared to tackle new rules of the trade. European 
Governments were first to recognize this new trend and went 
ahead to forge new relationships. What was lacking was 
innovative ways to reconstruct national structures to 
effectively compete in the new global market. This was most
Wilhemsen, W., Is There a Future for the European Shipowner-Yes and No, Money and Ships in the' City, Seatrade Conference, Barbican Centre, March 20-22, 1985, at 16.
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evident in European-Far East relationships.^®
In Europe, the need to eliminate substandard ships vas 
recognized and such effort was marked for success at the 
outset. Although the need was clear and concerted action 
was necessary, the motivating factors which eventually 
spurred this action were misguided. The revival of shipping 
in Europe would not entirely rest on uniformity of rules or 
applications. European competitors need to reassess their 
relative position in the market and work toward improving 
their competitive edge. The application of technical 
requirements on shipowners is necessary in so far as the 
underlying reasons relate solely to the safety of life and 
property at sea and marine pollution prevention, and not 
commercial or political gains.
Substandard ships are still a major concern in the 
global market because the potential harm of such ships 
nearly always have far-reaching consequences. The efforts 
to eliminate them have taken the right direction, in that 
national governments are taking the initiative, both 
collectively and unilaterally, to identify such ships, and 
restrict their movements in port states within the scope of 
the relevant international conventions and IMO regulations.
Liang, M. H., Hong Kong Shipowners-Past, Present and Future, Money and Ships in the City, Seatrade Conference, Barbican Centre, March 20-22, 1985, at 84.
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I I
THE LEGAL- HAS I S EOH 
HOF5T STATE COHTEROL
A. The Nationality of Ships.
As early as 1905 the question of what determines the 
nationality of a ship was settled. In the Muscat Dhows case 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague held that 
the ship's flag and registry, not its ownership, determined 
the nationality of the ship.^ In that case sailing 
dhows owned by the sultan of Muscat but flying the French 
flag were held entitled to do so even though Muscat was at 
the time a British protectorate.^ This holding reinforced 
a practice dating back to the 19th century or earlier.^
Today, it is a common principle of international law 
that states have the excusive right to grant nationality. 
International law also requires that ships on the high seas 
possess a national character and the criteria by which 
national character is conferred is a matter of domestic law. 
In Lauritzen v. Larsen. the U.S. Supreme Court held, "each 
state under international law may determine for itself the 
conditions on which it will grant its nationality to a 
merchant ship, thereby accepting responsibility for it and 
acquiring authority over it.^ The ship's flag 
and registration papers are evidence of its nationality
^ The MUSCAT DHOWS, Hague Court Reports 93 (1916).
2 Ibid.
^ Carlisle, R. Sovereignty for Sale, Annapolis, Naval 
Institute Press, 1981, Introduction at xiii.
^ 345 U.S. 571 <1953).
^ Ibid.
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Although the unilateral grant of nationality is in the 
category of the political "act of state" doctrine, thus' 
requiring recognition by other states, the practice is often 
criticized in so far as the use of open registries or flags 
of convenience is concerned.^ The debate centers around 
whether the act of registration denotes the grant of 
nationality or whether there need be a meaningful or "genuine link" between the ship and the flag.^ Originally 
proposed by the International Law Commission, this vague 
undeterminable concept has found its way into Article 5 of 
the Convention on the High Seas, 1958, which entered into 
force on September 30, 1962, as well as the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1962 and the United 
Nations Convention on Conditions for the Registration of 
Vessels. 1986, neither of which has entered into force.
The roots of the genuine link doctrine can be traced to
the Nottebohm case, in* which the International Court of
Justice upheld the decision by the Government of Guatemala
to decline recognition of Liechtenstein's claim of
diplomatic immunity for its national, Freidrich Nottebohm on
the grounds that Nottebohm's naturalization was fraudulantly
obtained and he had no genuine connection with Liechtenstein
since he lived ii? Guatemala for thirty four years and had
onot disavowed his German citizenship. In cases involving
dual nationality," preference is given to the real and 
effective nationality relying on the criteria of the 
Nottebohm case. However, the transfer of the ratio
decidendi of the Nottebohm case to that of the grant of 
national character to ships is suspect. Guatemala's
® Dempsey, P. & Helling, L., Oil Pollution by Ocean 
Vessels - An Environmental Tragedy. 10 J. of Int'1 Law and Pol 38 (1980). at 56.
^ Ibid.
® Ibid., at 59. 
o’ The Nottebohm Case (Second Phase), I.C.J. Rep. 4 (1955).
McDougal & Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans: A Contemporary Law of the Sea. New Haven, New Haven Press, 1965, at 1029.
10
underlying defense that case was Nottebohm's fraudulent 
acquisition of Liechtenstein nationality whilst retaining 
his German nationality. In the general case of the grant of 
national character to ships states have the same exclusive 
right to determine the relevant criteria as they have in 
relation to the grant of citizenship to persons. It 
follows, then, that in exercizing their sovereign rights to 
grant nationality, the satisfaction of the established 
domestic criteria entitles recognition by other states. But 
the Convention on the High Seas states:
There must exist a genuine link between 
the state and the ship; in particular, 
the state must effectively exercise its 
jurisdiction and control in
administrative, technical and social 
matters over ships flying its flag.^^
The lack »->f a ricar definition of the genuine link has 
led to serious disagreements among scholars. Professor 
Myres McDougal has been quoted as saying that the only 
purposes served by the genuine link concept "are those of 
disruption, controversy and anarchy", on the other hand 
Professor Boczek belives the problem lies in Article 5 of 
the Convention si^nce it does not consider the issue of 
beneficial ownership. Notwithstanding, the practice of 
open registries and flags of convenience continue to 
flourish. This traditional approach to the grant of 
nationality to ships based on the act of state doctrine 
remains firmly entrenched in customary international law but 
the issue of the genuine link continues to loom over the 
legitimacy of the practice.
Convention on the High Seas, 1958 Article 5. Reproduced in McDougal and Burke 1153 et seq.
12 Dempsey and Helling, at 60-61, citing McDougal, Burke and Vlasic, The Maintenance of Public Order at Sea and Nationality of Ships, 54 Am J. of Int'l Law 25 (I960) at 30- 34, and Boczek B., Flags of Convenience: An International Legal Study. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1962.
Ibid. , at 62.
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B. Jurisdiction over ships.
The Convention on the High Seas declares in Article 6 
that ships shall sail under the flag of one state only and, 
save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in 
international treaties or in these articles, shall be 
subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas, " 
This provision is a clear reaffirmation of the sovereignty 
of the sea principle embodied in customary international 
law. Previously, this sovereignty denoted an absolute 
political sovereignty comparable to that enjoyed by a state 
in regard to its territory. Today the principle has 
been redefined as a freedom to exercise jurisdiction to the 
exclusion of all other authorities, subject to national law 
or international law limitations, which is, in fact, a 
restriction or denial of absolute sovereignty.In 
the global over-extended political and commercial atmosphere 
of today's world, states are assuming more and more 
responsibility for occurrences leading to an interwinding of 
roles, rights and duties. The net result is a realization 
that absolute sovereignty is undesirable, and should be 
replaced by rules of application to effectively regulate the 
increasing "interdependence and ordered cooperation" among 
states.
/*
The Convention recognizes the need to maintain the 
■public order of the high seas and in Article 22 provides 
certain exceptions to the exclusive jurisdiction rule. This 
Article states that unless a treaty provides otherwise, a 
warship which encounters a merchant ship on the high seas 
may board the merchant ship if there are justifiable grounds 
for suspection that the ship is engaged in piracy, slave 
trading or in reality belongs to the same nationality as the 
warship.
Piracy is defined by Article 15 of the Convention as 
illegal acts of violence, desertion or depredation committed




by crew or passengers of a private ship for private gains 
against another ship on the high seas or outside the 
jurisdiction of any state, as well as cooperating with a 
pirate ship or aiding and inciting acts of piracy. 
Customary international further expounds on the types of 
acts which would constitute piracy but they will not 
be discussed here.
Slave trading which is an attack against human dignity 
has long been recognized as a crime against humanity and has 
been universally denounced in several international 
conventions. Therefore all states have an obligation
under the authority of existing conventional law to suppress 
slave trading.
A third basis for intervening with foreign flag vessels 
on the high seas lies in the case of oil pollution damage or 
the threat thereof. The International Convention Relating 
to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution 
Casualties, 1969, which entered into force on May 6, 1975, 
institutionalizes a claim made by some coastal states to 
interfere with foreign flag vessels on the high seas 
involved in casualties which could cause damage to their 
coaslines and private property.
f
Other than the above exceptions no other authority 
exists under customary international law to further restrict 
the severeign exercise of jurisdiction by flag states over 
vessels flying their flag on the high seas. Where states 
find a necessity•based on national security concerns to 
interfere with foreign flag vessels on the high seas the 
usual means to seeking legal exercise of jurisdiction is 
through bilateral agreements. A number of such agreements 
probably already exist and with the escalation of 
international criminal acts such as the international
McDougal and Burke, at 1157. References to aircraft are irrelevant here, thus they have been omitted.
18 See generally, Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law. 3d. ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979, at 243-53.
McDougal and Burke, at 1086-87.
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trafficking of drugs another exception to the sovereignty of 
the high seas rule is likely to take hold, not necessarily 
as a further develoment of customary international law but 
in the form of an internation convention.
C. Jurisdiction of Port States.
International law recognizes the right of port states 
and coastal states to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over 
foreign flag vessels in the territorial sea regarding events 
relating to matters affecting those states' interests.^® 
However as shall be discused further infra, in the exercise 
of jurisdiction regarding the protection of those interests 
port states and coastal states impose environmental and 
safety obligations on foreign flag vessels entering their 
territorial waters and ports, thereby affecting either 
directly or indirectly the internal order of the ship's 
affairs.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the seas 
(UNCLOS) codifies three categories of power already claimed 
by port states in the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign 
flag vessels in the territorial sea. These are the 
prevention of passage that is not innocent, the exercise of 
criminal jurisdiction over persons and events on board, and 
the enforcement of local environmental and safety 
regulations.
These three categories can easily be interrelated in 
thaithe states' interpretation of criminal, activities which 
may render passage not innocent is broad. Similarly, the 
wilful discharge of pollutants into the territorial sea or 
exclusive economic zone may be construed to be a criminal 
act.
In the exercise of port state control, however, states
^ have generally relied on the enforcement powers embodied in
^ Dempsey and Helling, at 64.
UNCLOS Arts. 25, 27, 218 and 219. See also, Sherer, I., Problems of Jurisdiction and Law Enforcement Against Delinquent Vessels. 35 Int'l & Comp. Law Q. 320 (1986), at 325-6.
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UNCLOS Article 218 et sea. as well as other international 
conventions. This move away from the choice of the unclear 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction is a manifestation by port 
states of the limitation of' applicability of this type of' 
intervention in the ships affairs. Although port state 
enforcement may be read into virtually every international 
maritime convention only a handful need to be discussed as 
truly relevant to port state control jurisdiction and 
enforcement. These are the Convention on the Territorial 
Sea and Contiguous zone, 1958; UNCLOS 1982, International 
Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in 
Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, 1969, International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by 
Oil, 1973, as amended by the Protocol of 1978; International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1978; Protocol of 
1978 relating to the International Convention for the Safety 
of Life at Sea, 1974; International Convention on Load 
Lines, 1966; Convention on the International Regulations for 
Preventing Collisions.at Sea, 1972: International Convention 
on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for 
Seafarers, 1978, and Convention concerning Minimum Standards 
in Merchant Ships, 1978.
These Conventions ascribe certain standards for 
merchant ships arid empowers port states to enforce the 
provisions on foreign flag vessels entering their ports. 
Although some state have in the past claimed certain rights 
of enforcement under customary international law, the 
legality of such actions has always been suspect. This is
not to say that port states have never had any rights of
enforcement under customary international law. For example, 
in the Wildenhus case the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a state 
court ruling that local authorities may exercise
jurisdiction over events on board a vessel of such a grave 
nature or disorder to disturb the "tranquility and public 
order on shore or in the port." ^ Similarly, in the case
^ In re Wildenhus, et al., 120 U.S. 1 (1887), at 18. 
In that case the Supreme Court rejected the claims of Belgium that local authorities in New Jersey had no authority to arrest a crew member who killed another crew member below deck of a Belgian vessel which was tied up at the New Jersey pier. The Court reasoned that the verynature of the act of murder disturbs the community's peace
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of Compania de Naveaacion Nacional (Panama) V. United 
States. the court allowed the arrest of a vessel which, on 
her prior visit to port incurred liabilities for a 
coirision." The applicability of this case has since been 
limited by Article 20 of the Territonal Sea Convention, 
1958,^ which permits arrest only in case of liability arising 
out of current visits to port or in the territorial waters 
of the port state.
D. International Conventions and IMO Resolutions adopting 
Port State Control.
The Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous 
Zone, 1958 (TSC '58> is the first* convention to clarify the 
ambiguties of customary international law regarding the 
jurisdiction of port states over foreign flag merchant 
vessels. The relevant provi-sions ate Articles 14 to 20 on 
innocent passage, levy of fees, criminal and civil 
jurisdiction on persons and- events on board. For the 
purposes of the exertion of civil jurisdiction, the 
provisions of Article 14.4 can be interpreted to include the 
enforcement of port • state safety and environmental
protection regulations.^^ However, the broad interpre­
tation of Article 14.4 can lead to several different 
applications of rfational law to persons and events on board 
vessels to whom the plain meaning of the Convention was not 
intended.
The above provisions, nevertheless have a- place in the 
public order of the seas,- and consequently, they were 
embodied into the' United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS). UNCLOS goes further in adopting 
innovative extentions of port state jurisdiction in safety 
of navigation and environmental protection matters. Article 
21 gives port and coastal states the discretion to adopt
nature of the act of murder disturbs the community's peace and quiet, thus it was a disorder under international law.
^ 6 R.I.A.A. 382 (1933) .
24 Article 14.4 provides that "passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coas^l state."
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Foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage 
through the territorial sea shall comply with all such laws 
and regulations and all generally accepted international 
regulations relating to the prevention of collision at sea.
Article 21.2 is similarly written to require ships 
entering the territorial sea of port states to comply with 
"generally accepted international rules or standards. The 
Convention is clearly cognizant of the achievements of the 
maritime community in creating effective standards for the 
safety of life at sea and marine pollution prevention. In 
so far as marine pollution prevention is concerned, Articles 
216, 218 and 220 give port states the jurisdiction to,lr“ 
require foreign flag vessels to comply with international 
rules and standards and authorize port states to enforce 
these rules and standards, which include numerous safeguards 
to protect foreign vessels from undue burdens and to prevent 
the usurpation of flag state jurisdiction. Article 227 bars 
discrimination against foreign flag vessels and Article 231 
requires the port state to promptly notify the flag state 
and other states of actions taken against foreign flag 
vessels. Article 225 gives the guidelines for the physical 
inspection of foreign flag vessels which include a 
prohibition on undue delay and facilitation of repairs or 
correction of deficiencies. These provisions indicate an 
intention towards the remedial, rather than penal
application of safety and environmental protection rules and 
standards. UNCLOS recognizes the need for states to 
cooperate in achieving safe seas and a pollution free marine 
environment, but more importantly, though not yet in force, 
UNCLOS forms a new bedrock for the development of 
conventional international law regarding the rights, duties 
and relationships of flag states and port states in the ever 
expanding world of shipping. Additionally, UNCLOS puts a 
vital stamp of approval' of the world community on the 
efforts of the maritime community to take responsibility for 
its activities, because the effects are felt by everyone on 
the globe.
Another convention on port state jurisdiction which was 
embodied into the UNCLOS was the 1969 Intervention
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Another convention on port state jurisdiction which was 
embodied into the UNCLOS was the 1969 Intervention 
Convention. That convention extends the authority of port 
or coastal states to intervene on the high seas to protect 
their coastlines or other interests. Some states have long 
claimed this right as a further restriiction on the 
sovereignty of flag states, but the emergence of this 
convention was the result of the TORREY CANYON disaster, 
which devastated the coastlines of France and Britain. The 
gravity of that disaster, at that time, led the maritime 
world to provide for the early intervention of threatened 
states in cases of maritime casualties on the high seas to 
avert a similar occurance.
Other conventions which mandate the imposition of rules 
and standards enacted provisions giving port states the 
authority to apply the convention to vessels flying the flag 
of states not parties to those conventions include SOLAS '74 
Chapter I Regulation 19, regarding the validity of 
certificates and corresponding equipment; MARPOL '73, '76
Articles V, and Articles IV and VI regarding port state 
control and operational control, STCW Article X Regulation I 
regarding licenses and minimum age, and Load Lines Article 
XXI. COLREGS and ILO 147 have been interpreted to authorize 
port state control adminstrative action although not 
expressly provided for. ILO 147 does, however, provide for 
the enforcement of the convention on non-party foreign 
vessels.
The UNCCORS 1986 makes only one minor reference to port 
states by recommending that ships carry proper documentation 
and make same available to port state authorities.^
The reason for this is said to be the result of a compromise 
between the Group of 77 countries and China on one hand, and 
the Group B countries on the other.The Group of 
77 argued that port state control was only a temporary 
remedy or supplement to flag state control but could never
^ Article 6(4).
Kasoulides, G., The 1986 United Nations Convention on the Conditions for the Registration of Vessels and the Question of Open Registry. 20 Ocean Dev. & Int'l Law 543 (1989). at 560.
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the flag state responsiblity, and port state control did not 
"tackle the basic economic and social problems of open 
registry shipping percieved by the Group." ^ Nevertheless, 
there were some references to port state control in the 
drafts and the Group B countries seized the opportunity to 
strengthen the wording of those drafts by insisting on the 
institutionalization of port state control." As a 
result, the above compromise was reached but all sides have 
critized the Convention for failing to address fundamental
issues regarding port state jurisdiction. 29
In addition to conventions the IMO Assembly has passed 
several resolutions involving port state control and
cooperation between, members regarding casualties and 
pollution prevention, the most important being Resolution 
A. 466 (XII) 1981 on Procedures for the Control of Ships and 
Resolution A.542 (XIII) 1983 on Procedures for the Control 
of Ships and Discharges under Annex 1 of MARPOL 73,78,^^ 
Resolution A. 466 was the culmination of the work of the 
Maritime Safety Committee to develop a set of procedures to 
assist flag states in controlling ships which do not comply 
with the SOLAS and Load Lines Conventions. In reaffirming 
its commitment to maritime safety the resolution invites 
member governments and contracting governments to provide 
information on Services available in each country foro 
carrying out port state control and inform the IMO of action 
taken against ships found to be deficient. The procedures 
for control are detailed in the annex to the Resolution. 
Resolution A.542 (XIII) also invites member governments and 
contracting parties implement the procedures as well as 
provide information on action taken in this respect. The 
Annex to Resolution A.542 details the technical requirements 




^ Ibid., at 566.
^ Resolutions A.466 <XII> and A.542 <XIII) are 
reproduced in Appendix I.
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E. The "no more favorable treatment" Clause.
The legal basis for applying the provisions of the 
above conventions lie in the port states acceptance and 
enforcement of the convention as part of its national law. 
In each case the provisions for control or applicability 
gives the guidance for the exercise of Jurisdiction. In 
some cases this guidance is quite clearly specified while in 
other cases it can only be found by interpretation. To 
avert the possibility of double standards, especially in the 
application of the provisions of the convention to ships of 
non-contracting states the concept.of the "no more favorable 
treatment ** wound its way into succeeding conventions. 
MARPQL *73 was the first to incorporate the clause which 
reads:
With respect to ships of non-parties to 
the convention, the parties shall apply 
the requirements of the convention as 
may be necessary to ensure that no more 
favorable treatment is given to such 
ships.(emphasis mine). Art. 6.
Similar clauses later found their way into the 1978 Protocol 
to SOLAS and the STCW. Today, the "no more favorable 
treatment" clause is arguably the cljSarest and most 
extensive assertion of the Jurisdiction of port states, 
which does not supercede the flag states, but is concurrent 
with it.^^ Out of this clause has grown a number 
of practices involving port state control but although the 
exercise of this Jurisdiction has gained wide spread 
acceptance, criticisms persist and reservations regarding 
the fair enforcement of port state control remain.
Mensah, T., Port State Control and Maritime Safety: An IMO Perspective, Port State Control, Report of a Conference, New York, Center for Seafarers Rights,April 2-4, 1986.
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CHAF^TEIR III
F»OFiT state: control E:3srE*ORCE:M:E:2srT
A, Tlie Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State 
Control.
Following the 1976 signing of the ILO 147 regulating 
social and working conditions on board vessels, eight 
European states decided to enter into an agreement to 
enforce the provisions of safety oriented international 
conventions on all foreign vessels entering their ports, and 
on March 2, 1976 the Hague Memorandum was signed.^ Ebcactly 
fifteen days later on March 17, 1978, the AMOCO CADIZ ran 
aground off the coast of Brittany. The members to the Hague 
Memorandum realized the need for greater participation as 
that memorandum had very little impact on shipping.‘
The environmental, economic and political pressures as 
well as the AMOCO CADIZ casualty, which spurred European 
politicians, shipowners and the electorate into what was 
hitherto considered impossible concerted action to eliminate 
substandard shipping resulted in an effort by the Commission 
of the European Communities to develop for member states a 
directive on the enforcement of safety and pollution 
prevention regulations on all ships entering the community ports.^
^ Huibers, H. , The Memorandum of Understanding on Port 
State Control: Four years of Effectiveness. Port StateControl, Report of a Conference, New York, Center for Seafarers Rights,April 2-4, 1966 at 12.
Lowe, A. V., A Move against Substandard Shipping. 6 Marine Policy 326 (Oct 1982).
^ Huibers, H., Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Sea 
Promoted by Control in Port, speech delivered to the 9th Annual Symposium on the Transport and Handling of Dangerous Goods by Sea and Inland Waters, pp 431-45, Rotterdam, 1987 at 431.
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Consequently in January 1982, the drafting group of the 
present Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control 
(MOU) submitted a draft to a ministerial conference of 
fourteen European states, namely, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom, which adopted the draft text; it was then signed 
by the maritime representatives of the fourteen states and 
entered into force on July 1, 1982.^ The method of entering 
into such an agreement with international implications 
deserves comment. A basic principle of international law is 
that states have the right to enter into agreements with 
other states either to restrict or expand their sovereeign 
rights tto the extent permitted by such agreements. A number 
of ways of entering such agreements have been developed over 
the years, with varying degrees of enforceability. Treaties 
or conventions are the most common and the most powerful in 
terms of enforcement because when states become parties to 
these agreements they agree to bound themselves to its 
provisions.® Other types of multilateral agreements which 
are loss powerful than treaties include the diplomatic 
notes verbale, memorandums of understanding and communiques. 
First of all, several considerations led the ministers 
concerned to choose a memorandum of understanding rather 
than a multilateral convention. Juridically conventions are 
much more powerful instruments than memorandums, with a 
mandatory effect for the states parties and those to whom 
the conventions apply.^ However, the choice of a 
simple memorandum of understanding was more acceptable to 
the ministers because unlike international conventions.
Huibers, The Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control, at 12-13.
Wiswall, F. L., Port State enforcement of IMCO Originating Safety Legislation - A Liberian Perspective. Shipcare, Intec Press Ltd., 1982, at 4.
^ Huibers, The Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by 
Sea, at 438.
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memorandums do not require tedious ratification processes, 
entrusted to the unpredictable whims of parliaments and they 
do not require the "extensive adoption of national 
legislation, necessary to enforce such conventions" or to 
amend them. ^ It was therefore necessaary for the ministers 
to settle for a simplifiied agreement in order to use the 
momentum that had been gained to seek workable solutions to 
the substandard shipping problem. The negative side is that 
the member states are not bound by any obligation to do 
anything. All that is involved is a moral undertaking by 
the maritime authorities of the fourteen states to cooperate 
in a regional plan of port state control in accordance with 
the provisions of the agreement with a hope that the 
harmonization of procedures can be achieved.
pUnder the terms of the MOU the partners undertake 
to conduct port state control "without discrimination as to 
flag" on foreign flag vessels entering their ports, with a 
target to inspect at least 25% of all vessels entering each 
port within a twelve month period. A control feature of the 
MOU is the reporting and cooperation and exchange of 
information between the authorities. The relevant
instruments for the purposes of the MOU are:
I The International Convention on
Load Lines, 1966;
I The International Convention for
the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 
(SOLAS '74)
! The Protocol of 1978 relating to
SOLAS '74;
t The International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships, 1973, as modified by the
^ Ibid.
p" Following is a summary of the substantive provisions of the MOU. The text of the MOU is reproduced in Appendix III.
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Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL 73,78);
5 The International Convention on
Standards of Training,
Certification and Watchkeeping for 
Seafarers, 1978 (STCW 78);
' The Convention on the International
Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea, 1972 (COLREGS); 
and
} The Merchant Shipping (Minimum
Standards) Convention, 1976
(ILO 147).
Currently, all the authorities apply the provisions of 
the above instruments as the states to which they belong are 
parties thereto, except Ireland which has not acceded to 
MARPOL 73,78. In addition, not all states concerned are 
parties to the optional annexes to MARPOL 73,78, and as 
such, their authorities will not apply those. As all of 
these conventions apply substantially to vessels of 500 
gross tons or above, the parties will, particularly in the 
case of the caipriage of dangerous goods, apply the
conventions to the extent permitted or will ensure that such 
vessels are not hazardous to safety, health or the 
environment. Section 2.4 provides that the relevant
instruments be applied so that no more favorable treatment 
is given to foreign flag vessels belonging to states, not 
parties to those instruments.
Section 3 provides that inspections be carried out on 
board in order to check the validity of relevant 
certificates and documents, the lack of which is considered 
to be prima facie evidence that the ship Is substandard. 
The absence, non-compliance or substantial deterioration of 
machinery or equipment or the hull is also prima facie 
evidence that the ship is substandard. Vessels which have 
been inspected by a participating authority within the prior 
six months may be exempted unless clear grounds exist for 
reinspection.
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Clear grounds include submission of a written complaint 
or information from crew, passengers, associations or 
professional bodies, others with interest in the ship's 
safety and other port states. The procedures on receiving 
such information and after control include notifying the 
flag state and classification society, avoiding undue delay 
of the ship, notifying IMO in accordance with SOLAS '74
Chapter I Regulation 19 and Load Lines Article 21. All
determinations of deficiencies are subject to the
professional judgment of the port state control inspector
who should be well qualified to conduct inspections.
The MOU has a simple organizational structure designed 
to maintain a clear separation of tasks. The executive body 
of the MOU is the Port State Control Committee (PSC 
Committee) which is comprised of the representatives of the 
fourteen participating maritime authorities, the commission 
of the European Communities, the International Maritime 
Organization and the International Labor Organization. The 
PSC Committee meets twice a year to deal with harmonizing 
port state control procedures, uniformity in interpreting 
and applying convention provisions, review of the Memorandum 
and financial matters.^
/ •
A three member permanent Secretariat comprising of the 
Director, the Legal Officer and a Technical Officer, 
situated at the Ministry of Transport and Public Works of 
the Netherlands in Rijswijk, and functions under the
direction of the PSC Committee. The Secretariat prepares 
the meetings, drafts reports, organizes seminars, provides 
ducumentation to interested parties, monitors the inspection 
file in cooperation with the Computer Center and does public 
relations.
The Computer Center of the MOU is situated at St. Malo, 
Prance, where all the inspection records are sorted and
^ Huibers, The Memorandum of Understanding on Port 
State Control,' at 14.
Ibid.
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filed. This information is accessible for verifying and 
updating records as well as statistical analysis. All MOU 
partners have a linkup to the Center and use the facility as 
an electronic mailbox system which has proven its 
effectiveness over the last three years.
Finally, there are the surveyors, the highly qualified 
experts, each working directly for his maritime authority, 
who will conduct the actual inspections. Most are said to 
be qualified as shipmasters or chief engineers with 
considerable seagoing experience. Annual seminars are 
conducted for surveyors with the* aim of helping them become 
aucurrent with changes in the MOU and advancements in the 
industry as well as the harmonization of the inspection 
procedures.*^
Although total harmonization of procedures is 
impossible to achieve a general pattern for the inspection 
procedure has been established. First, a list of vessels 
expected in port and due for inspection is prepared, 
preferably each morning, taking note of those vessels with 
a history of past deficiencies.^^ The inspector may 
choose to inspect those vessels first. The initial 
inspection is a cursory one enroute to the Captain's office 
for a look at tl),e relevant certificates and documents on 
board. If clear grounds exist, a detailed inspection of all 
life-saving and > fire fighting equipment, passageways, 
accomodation spaces, galley, pantry, engine room, alarms, 
navigational charts and equipment, and radio, etc. may 
ensue. Otherwise the inspection ends. If, however,
deficiencies are found, the surveyor has the discretion to
^ Ibid. See also, Kasoulides, G., Paris Memorandum of 
Understanding: Six Years of Regional Enforcement. 20 Marine Pollution Bulletin 255 (1969), at 256.
12 Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control Annual Report, 1988, at 17-18.
Newbury, R. L. , Implementation of Port State Control. excerpts of a paper delivered to the Honorable Company of Master Mariners, Oct’ 10, 1984, at 121.
Ibid. , at 122.
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determine the time scale for rectifiicat ion, which,
depending on the severity of the deficiency, may involve a 
delay or permission to rectify the deficiency at the next 
port of call. However, in the case of dangerous 
deficiencies the vessel will be subject to the capital 
sanction of detention until the deficiency is removed. 
Section 4 of the MOU provides that all inspections be 
reported.
Although the MOU provides a safeguard against 
discriminatory enforcement this is effective in 
institutional matters only. The broad discretion granted 
the individual inspector may afford MOU states a legal 
loophole through which they can discriminate according to 
flag, because simple verbal pointers may suffice for such 
discrimination to take place. If this roundabout route is 
employed on a moderate to wide scale, the MOU safeguard 
becomes meaningless and confidence in port state control 
will erode. The continued training and upgrading of port 
state control inspectors, through seminars, is the most 
effective way of maintaining the ideal of the concept and 
preventing the use of port state control by unscrupulous 
inspectors to harass and inconvenience shipping.
Another poss^ible conflict is in the MOU states' 
enforcement of ILO 147. The 1989 Amendments to Annex 1 
extend control to articles of agreement, repatriation, 
shipowner's liability in cases of sickness, injury or death 
of seafarers and trade union rights.^® Although the 
amended section only provides for the transmission of 
deficiencies regarding the above to the flag states, etc..
Huibers. Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control, at 15.
Mensah, T., Port State Control and Maritime Safety- An IMO Perspective. Port State Control, Report of a Conference, New York. Center for Seafarers Rights, April 2- 4, 1986. at 27.
18 Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control Secretariat letter ref. S/MP- 10.048/89 and attachments concerning the Amendments to Annex 1 Section 4 of the MOU. March 13, 1989.
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it is not difficult to see that the MOU is slowly
progressing beyond matters relating to safety of life and 
property at sea and pollution prevention, into the realm of 
social conditions on board vessels which is a direct 
intervention into the internal order of the ship's affairs.
Notwithstanding these problems, according to the 1988 
Annual Report the MOU's chief concern is still marine safety 
and pollution prevention. Appendix V <i) that although the 
numbers of individual ships and inspections were down in 
1988 from the previous year the number of delays/detentions 
and percentages of individual ships increased. For 
delays/detentions per ship's type the biggest change is a 4% 
decline for dry bulk carriers in 1988 from 1987, with a 
corresponding decline in cargo vessels . Unfortunately, the 
figures for tankers/combined carriers climbed by 3% in 1988. 
In 1988, far more safety and pollution related deficiencies 
were reported than crew related deficiencies.
Eight years on, MOU authorities have given the program 
the thumbs up. Although the target of 25% still eludes the 
partners (1968 calculated at 18.2%), they see the general 
situation balancing itself out with the lax partners beefing 
up their inspections. The annual seminars are 
successful and the electronic mailbox is helping to add to 
the efficient selection of vessels to inspect. There is one 
concession though, "the battle to eliminate substandard 
ships is a long and hard one."^
B. Port State Control Enforcement in the United States.
A good example of unilateral port state control 
applying more stringent measures.is the United States Coast 
Guard inspection program. Although the United States first 
enacted legislation on the control of foreign and domestic 
vessels in 1917, it was not until 1972 that significant
Annual Report 1988, at 19-20.
" Huibers, Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control, at 16.
26
moves to promote tanker safety were initiated.Finally 
in 1977, following the ARGO MERCHANT incident the Coast
Guard Tanker Boarding Program was established. 22
Several legislative enactments have over the years
expanded the Coast Guard's duties to administer maritime
laws related to the safety of vessels, marine environment
protection, licensing of operating personnel, inspection of
vessels to ensure compliance and the protection of merchant 
23seamen. The international conventions enforced on
foreign flag vessels include MARPOL 73,76, SOLAS 74 and the
Protocol of 78, Load Lines, COLREGS, and most recently ILO 24147. It has been suggested that effective enforcement 
of ILO 147 would require the Coast Guard to increase its 
size just to handle the large number of complaints expected 
to arise, and the budgetary constraints facing the
organization would not permit this.^ ILO 147 is 
discussed in some detail in in Chapter VI.
The arm of the Coast Guard Charged with the
responsibility of implementing the United Statesd Marine 
Inspection Program is the Merchant Inspection and
Documentation Division, which serves as the program manager 
and administers the program for the improvement of standards 
including inspection of vessels, development of improved 
inspection compliance standards, and the development and 
enforcement of the Outer Continental Shelf Safety Program, etc.^^ These duties are delegated in part to the
21 Dempsey & Helling, L. Oil Pollution by Ocean Vessels: An Environmental Tragedy, 10 J. of Int'l Law & Pol 37 <1980), at 73-75.
22 Loree, P., Port State Control- A Shipowner Perspective. Port State Control, Report of a Conference, New York, Center for Seafarers Rights, April 2-4, 1986, at 31.






US Coast Guard. Organization Manual, Commandant Instruction (COMDTINST) M5400.7C (1989), at 2.8.43-5.
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Marine Safety Division of the District Office, and further 
to the Marine Licensing and Vessel Inspection Branch, which 
administers the District Marine Safety Offices (MSO) and 
Marine Inspection Offices (MIO).^ In each major port 
there is a Captain of the Port (COTP) and an Officer in 
Charge of Marine Inspection (OCMI) who will be responsible 
for the actual field inspections.^ The inspectors 
report to the COTP or the OCMI.
All foreign flag vessels trading in US waters are 
subject to annual inspections and semi-annual monitoring. 
Arriving vessels must provide 24 hours advance notice of 
arrival to the Coast Guard^ and the vessel's history 
is then obtained through the Marine Safety Information 
System (MSIS). This history includes last annual inspecton 
date and compliance history, including violations, oil 
spills and other discrepancies. The inspection procedures 
follow a prescribed form which requires the inspector to 
check the various certificates, navigational equipment 
including charts, harzadou£> cargo carried in bulk or 
packaged, pollution prevention equipment and provides for 
follow-up action. (See Appendix VI). Tankers which are in 
compliance with the regulations are issued a "Letter of 
Compliance." The most common types of deficiencies
generally involve^..US nautical charts which are required for 
every foreign flag vessel entering United States waters.
There are generally four types of action available to 
the Coast Guard for deficienciies. They are permitting the 
vessel to sail to the next port of call to effect repairs if
^ Ibid., at 4.1.29-30 and 36.
^ Robinson, Cpt. T., Practical Aspects of Enforcement 
of Safety. Safety in Shipping, Hamburg, BIMCO General Meeting, May 29, 1969, at 4.
9Q The information regarding the procedures involved in the actual survey, of vessels was obtained through personal interviews with Lt. Comdr. Larry Brooks, Port Safety Officer, Group New York and other Coast Guard officials at USCG HQ in Washington, DC during the period March 12-23, 1990.
Robinson, at 5.
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such deficiency is not very serious and the repairs can more
readily be carried out at the next port of call, detention
for the sole purpose of rectifying the deficiency, the
imposition of a monetary penalty as a deterrent, which isprovided for by UnitedStates administrative law principles?^
and informing the flag state for appropriate action pursuant
to the relevant international instruments. In the case of
monetary penalties, the Coast Guard notes that this is a
national law provision distinct from the remedial basis of
the relevant conventions. However, the imposition of such
penalties is a demonstration of the incompatiIbi1ity which
sometimes arise when two different avenues are selected to
achieve a single end. The Coast Guard ends up fulfilling the
domestic requirements at the expense of international rules
of application. This is further reinforced by the fact that
half of all penalties addressed by the Coast Guard for
deficiencies involved nautical charts, which in fact
sometimes involved relatively minor violations. The Coast
Guard recognize that they often take such strict actions
when their purposes could have been served by less stringent
32measures, andwould be in line withthe international rules.
In the latter case the Coast Guard is empowered to enter 
into special agreements with flag states which permit direct 
contact with the consul of the flag state to speed up compliance by de^linquent vessels. ^ Such an 
agreement currently exists between the Coast Guard and the 
Liberian Bureau of Maritime Affairs.
Events of environmental concern tend to prompt keen 
interest in a particular industry's activities and the 
operation of vessels is no different. The incidents which 
prompted the United States to begin port state control 
enforcement were tanker related. Not surprisingly, the 
Coast Guard's activities in this area place a greater 
emphasis on tanker safety than freight vessels. The recent 
grounding of the EXXON VALDEZ gave rise to certain major new 
technical requirements for tankers such as double bottoms.
Ibid.
Ibid





The enforcement of these new requirements will no doubt rest 
with the Coast Guard again, and may require additional 
personnel to handle the new increased workload. 
Fortunately, the Coast Guard has recognized the need to 
reevaluate its enforcement measures, reputed to be the 
strictest in the world, water them down and place a greater 
emphasis on aiding compliance rather than the deterrence 
sought by punitive measures.^ This move, which is 
not necessarily a relaxation of standards, is essential to 
enable the Coast Guard to enforce the new tanker safety 
regulations as well as reports of complaints which would 
arise under ILO 147.
ih





A. The Legal Rights and responsibilities of Open Registries 
Regarding Port State Control Enforcement Problems.
Numerous definitions hve been offered for the term 
"open registry" and UNCTAD even went to the extent of 
offering a distinction between "open registry" and "Flag of 
Conveniance" by reporting open registry as a country with a 
declared open policy of conferring nationality on vessels 
regardless of ownership, control or manning.^ Because of 
continued confusion over the differences between open 
registries and flags of convenience the terms are used 
interchangeably. To add to the confusion are the development 
of two other types of registries, namely the "offshore 
register" and the second or "international register", both 
of which stem fr^m the closed or regulated registry. The 
closed registry is that in which ships are beneficially 
owned and manned by nationals of that state. Vessels in such 
registries are subject not only to administrative, technical 
and social regulations, but also commercial regulations as 
well. Today, same of these registries have offshore and 
international registers to cope with competition from open 
registers. Offshore registers such as the Cayman Islands, 
Gibraltar and the Isle of man belong to countries like the 
UK while France and Norway have set up international 
registers. Each of these registers have one or more
attractions to keep their beneficially owned tonnage at 
home. Such registers are likely to adopt the . same safety 
standards as the mother registry and- rely on the mother 
registry's established network for enforcement purposes. The
^ UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport 1972/73, paras 
39/42.
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net result of these "experiments" are mixed because if 
differences regarding the functions of each.
It is necessary to note here that the establishment of 
off-shore and second registers was spurred by the adoption 
by UNCTAD of the 1986 UNCCORS, which institutionalized the 
practice of open registries. But the industrialized 
cotmtries were not the only ones joining this band wagon. 
Before 1986 there were less than fifteen (15) open
registriesby the time UNCCORS was adopted the list had 
grown to more than thirty. (See Table III). This
proliferation of open registries has led to increased debate 
on the pros and cons of the open registry system and its 
impact on industrialized countries.^
As indicated earlier, the most ardent critics of the 
open registry system, * those industrialized countries 
suffering most from the shift of tonnage from their flags to 
foreign flags, and the general competitive edge of the 
system, turned their attention to the widely publicized 
short comings of the system, which .was reinforced by the 
increase in open registries. As was discussed in Chapter I, 
supra, the shift in arguments against open registries 
stemmed from the decision of the International Court of 
Justice at the Hague which up held the right of Liberia and 
Panama to become members of IMO's Maritime Safety Committee, 
auid rejected the arguments of other member states linking 
the obscurity of the genuine link concept to the IMO's 
definition of tonnage ownership.
The stortcomings of the open registry system can be 
found in Metaxis' hypothesis on flags of convenience and 
social costs:
Institute of Shipping Economics, Shipping Statistics 26 (1982). The list includes Liberia, Pa.nama, Singapore, Cyprus, Bermuda, Malta, Cayman Islands, Sri Lanka, St. Vincent, Costa Rica, Vanuatu, and St. Lucia.
^ Kasoulides, G., 1986 United Nations Convention on
Conditions for the Registration of Vessels and the Question of Open Registry. 20 Ocean Dev. & Int'l Law, 543 (1989), at 547.
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Table III
Opsn RcgistrN’ for ihe Period 1930-1986
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’Pa-ns of the British regisitr.
'Th*se S’.ai£S classified as rcaior open registry fleets by vsex^D 1984. Cyprus. Panama, 
and 3^.amas are the countries with the most rapidly expanding fleets according to OECD (19S4).
So-uTces Metaxa.s. rupra notes B. 9; Boczek. supra note B; Naess, supra note 3; Gold, supra 
note 4‘’- Srurmev. supra note 15; vse-.o .A.rmual Reports (19S1-19S4); OECD U5/1-19S4); 
Fleminc supra note 36: Drewry, supra note 2; and advertisements in the Economise (19s-4_) and 
Sfii^ork Times (1985); 1985 Jourrxl a'e la Marine MarcharJe, Februaty 10, 1983, p. 28/.
Flags of convenience led to the 
formation of a "regime of immunity" in 
the shipping vorld and in the long run 
to higher real costs and freight rates 
than would have been the case had the 
World merchant fleet consisted only of 
units registered under national flags, 
which presupposes the maintenance of a 
minimun safety and economic regulation^.
In analyzing the above, Metaxis identifies marine 
pollution from ships, casualties and loss of life at sea and 
discusses their impact on the world community. ^ 
Notwithstanding the other sources of marine pollution. The 
contribution of ships is significant enough to warrant major 
concern. Metaxis puts that figure at about 30% and shows 
that the spillage of oil from operational sources has a 
negative impact on public health, the marine environment, 
fisheries, way of life, tourism, etc.^ He then 
calculates potential pollution by flag to apportion actual 
spills and concludes that the emgering residual problems 
with marine pollution, giving the tremendous success of the 
IMO regarding technical safety and anti-pollution matters, 
"are of capital importance and that the appropriate concept 
should be that of a substandard registry rather than that of 
a substandard ship.^
With regard to marine casualties, Metaxis relies on a 
1976 study to show a stark relationship between flags of 
convenience and casualty rates, with smaller fleets showing 
worse safety records. His obvious conclusion is that their 
real costs of operation are therefore much higher and exit 
from the market under adverse condition^ are facilitated by
^ Metaxis. B.N., Flags of Convenience. Hants, Gower 
Publishing Co., 1985, at 76.
® Ibid.
^ Ibid., at 69-90.
^ Ibid., at 92.
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pthe regime of immunity.
As for loss of life, Metaxis has few concrete figures 
to rely on and consequently presupposes that, based on 
unreliable figures mortality rates on flag of convenience
qvessels are considerably higher than regulated vessels.^ In 
his scathing attack on open registries Metaxis failed to 
fully discuss the social benefits of the system nor created 
a scale either in favor or against the system. Also he did 
not take into account the mechanisms in place which provide 
for the compensation of damages or loss from oil spills and 
loss of life, or the regulations in force to protect against 
marine casualties.
Open registries are the result of innovative attempts 
to save world shipping from varying stages of international 
difficulties such as wars and economic recessions. The 
international nature qf the shipping industry necessitated 
protection from regulations which satisfy local anxieties at 
the expense of the wider global interest. Open registries 
today have been f ine tuned to meet the needs of an 
international market which has cut across practically every 
national boundry. The de-regulation of commerce leaves 
shipowners to become creative and the focus of the industry 
is now on the ability of the shipowner to manage, market and 
finance in order ifo survive. To achieve this, safety has not 
been compromised because the basic safety principles found 
in the various international conventions still apply and 
flag states are aware of this. The open registry system 
makes Jobs available to all seafarers where ever located. It 
is true that most shipowners who go to open registries 
employ third world seafarers for less wages than their 
western counterparts. This fact does not in itself make the 
system exploitative. First of all, shipowners have no need 
to employ third world seafarers if they have to pay these 
seafarers the same wages they would otherwise pay their own 
nationals. Secondly, those Jobs represent a significant
® Ibid., at 93, 97.
’ Ibid., at 99.
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proportion of employment for most of the labor supplying 
countries, which generally have very high unemployment rate. 
This does not go to say some shipowners do not exploit the 
seafarers. In such case, action must be taken against such 
shipowners. The object is to benefit from a system which 
makes competition easier, not to promote forced labor, 
therefore, competitive wage scales can be employed and 
inserted into freely negotiated collective bargaining 
agreements to ensure the protection of seafarers; indeed 
this is already being legislated by some open registries and 
should «xpand to others as well.
A number of conventions are in force regarding 
liability regimes for oil pollution damage,.loss of life and 
marine casualties. In addition to the safety conventions, 
these conventions complete the network of the international 
protective regime which is, in most' cases, adequate for the 
stated purpose. In cases of loss of life there can never be 
an adequate regime of compensation because it is impossible 
to put a value on human life. This is true in other 
industries as well. However, the conventions concerned aim 
to provide at least some compensation to help ease the 
damages and pain caused by such loss.
Not everyone' is concerned with arguments of which is 
substandard, the ship or the flag. In a discussion on 
substandard ships at Seatrade's Money and Ships in the City 
1965 Conference, a number of points were raised as the the 
reasons for the continued sailing of substandard ships in 
spite of the enforced international regulation.
Delegates to that Conference commented on the failure of 
classification societies, including lACS .members to
stringently enforce standards.There are today more than 
30 classification societies and lACS/ decision to get tough 
on substandard ships is bound to lead to major problems.
Seatrade, Money and Ships in the City, Barbican Centre, March 20-22, 1985 at 124-25.
Ibid . , at 124 .
Ibid.
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The delegates were painfully aware that there had not.been 
the kind of improvement in standards because of "substandard 
owners" who inevitably run substandard ships. Economic 
pressure has been blamed for this stagnation both from 
owners and the societies, all of whom are trying to survive 
in this fiercely competitive industry.The resolution 
of this problem will nbt be easy because there are relief 
valves available, particularly for small scale owners, 
registers and classification societies looking for an easy 
solution. Such owners will continue to seek relief in small 
impotent registries and unscrupulous classification 
societies which must class substandard vessels just to stay 
in business. This is not to write off the efforts of lACS. 
On the contrary, the improvement of service will clearly be 
of emmence value in the inspection and certification of 
vessels, particularly in those parts if the vessel where 
port state control inspectors are limited or otherwise 
restricted from inspecting. Also, seemingly standard vessels 
with fraudulent or unthorough certification will not get 
away with defects.
Although the industry has been fair in assessing the 
causes for the lack of significant improvement in standards 
over the years, the primary responsibility remains with the 
flag state. All rd^levant international conventions recognize 
the unequivocal responsibility for flag states to ensure 
that their vessels comply with internationally acceptable 
standards. The most eloquent assertion of this
responsibility, to date, is UNCLOS Article 94, which 
mandates that the flag state exercise effective jurisdiction 
and control over vessels flying its flags, take measures to 
ensure safety of life and property at sea, ensure that the 
vessel is regularly inspected and the crew are properly 
trained and qualified, and ensure that all vessels flying 
its flag conform to generally -accepted international 
conventions. Article 94 also requires that flag states 




states and provide remedy. Article 94 further mandates that 
flag states conduct inquiries into all marine casualties and 
marine pollution, especially where interests of another 
state are involved, and to cooperate with such states in 
such investigations or inquiries.
What is necessary for flag states to effectively 
enforce these provisions is an adequate infrastructure of 
administrative, and technical proportions totally out of the 
reach of small flag states, especially small open
............................... ..................................... . iiii|ii||iii<iaiij,>iii!Mi,»ii»i»ini«iW»wiinwwi»Wiii»Mrw«(awif»
registries. In the case of the small, developing national 
register, several different factors prevent the effective 
enforcement of flag state jurisdiction. The national 
infrastructure may be too poorly organized to ensure that 
the vessels' satisfy the requirements of the convention 
regarding international standards, or for political economic 
reasons the register may be forced to turn away from 
international regulations which may be considered too 
stringent and economically detrimental to the fledging 
fleet. This may be the reason why countries like India, 
South Korea, Bangladesh, Spain and Turkey constantly show up 
in pollution likeihood analysis (PLA) by flag as some of the 
worst f lags .
The problem'\^ith open registries may include the above, 
but in spite of that, many of the ships registered in open 
registries seldom or never call at the home port, and, given 
the size of the countries concerned (open registries tend to 
be small developing countries) they lack enforcement
capability. This is of great advantage to owners operating 
substandard ships. However, the lack of an enforcement 
capability should not be considered synonimous to the lack 
of a mighty navy to enforce international standards. Once 
the registry has ratified or acceeded to the relevant 
international instruments a two prong approach to 
enforcement can be considered..
Firstly, an adequate marine safety sector must be
Tintz, M., Port State Control vs. MarineEnvironmental pollution, at 192*. MOU 19S8 Annual Report 
Annex 2.
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established with computerized functions for adequate record 
keeping and updating. Secondly an adequate inspectorate 
needs to be established. This can consist of. qualified 
marine officers of the flag state who can be available in or 
travel to different ports to inspect vessels, or the use of 
the services of the classification societies. A combination 
of both is also possible. Classification societies, 
competition between them aside, .will enforce the flag 
stats's standards only to the extent authorizied and no 
further. Hence, the flag state, whether open or not, has the 
capability to adequately fulfill its obligation inder the 
conventions.
The above analysis shows that Professor Metaxis may 
have been partially right in referring to substandard flags, 
but was wrong in encircling open registries alone. The 
problem is not an open registry problem but a political 
economic problem which each flag state must come to grips 
with. The problem of substandard ships cut across all the 
traditional maritime battle lines, therefore the continued 
drawing of those lines will only exascerbate the problem 
even more. To illustrate, Gibraltor and the Isle of man, 
which were presumed to adopt the standards of the mother 
flag, the UK, rank sixth and ninth respectively in delays 
detentions per flag in 1988 while the mother flag, the UK 
was also listed, though last. This shows that every flag 
state, even those regarded as the best are succeptible to 
infiltration by substandard ships.
All of the figures in the debate on substandard ships 
lead to the conclusion that port state control, while not a 
substitute for flag state responsibility, is a sensible 
supplement to it. However, a number of questions arise when 
the enforcement of port' state control is mentioned but, in 
the case of open registries two questions bear the most 
weight, the extent of the concurrent jurisdiction of the 
port state and the application of such control without 
prejudice.
As was- expounded' on in Chapter II, port state 
jurisdiction is concurrent with the flag state jurisdiction, 
however, the exercise of the jurisdiction can also be
40
equated with a restriction on the sovereign jurisdiction of 
the flag state. In other words the more extensive the 
exercise of port state jurisdiction the more restricted the 
sovereign jurisdiction becomes. Although port state 
jurisdiction is a recognized principle of international law, 
the extent of that jurisdiction is still the subject of 
intensive debate. Port state jurisdiction, unchecked by 
international regulations can easily extend to the internal 
order of the ship's affairs. This is clea.rly a serious 
threat to all flag state and open registries in particular, 
because one of the major attraction of open registries is 
the non-commercial regulation of shipping.
The second threat to open registries as a result •of 
port state control is the possible discriminatory 
application of such control against open registry vessels. 
When states become parties to the relevant international 
conventions they agree to be bound by the provisions of 
these conventions and to have their vessels subject to the 
limited control afforded those port states parties to such 
conventions.^^ The maritime community has concluded that 
all sea-going vessels must comply with with the provisions 
of the aforementioned conventions. Hence, the exercise of 
port state control within the framework of these conventions 
should equally apply to all vessels irrespective of flag. 
Indeed, port state control authorities stress the non- 
discriminatory inspections they conduct. Unfortunately, the 
criticisms against open registries as avoiding standards and 
permitting the registration of substandard ships, 
which may have been true in some cases, was founded on 
economic pressures, environmental concerns and global 
commercialization.*" If port state control is politicized it 
will become discriminatory and would self-destruct, thereby 
creating political tension which would inevitably hamper the 
adoption of future conventions that invoke port state




control enforcement. In addition. Port state control 
inspectors will often make subjective judgments while
enforcing conventions like the vague ILO/147. With this 
background it is not difficult to see the reality of the 
threat of discriminatory control, and its damaging impact on 
the open registry system.
These issues are of paramount concern to open
registries but they do not necessarily warrant the abolition 
of port state control. The mechanisms which are currently in 
force to regulate port state control authorities have so far 
been successful in averting serious confrontation between 
flag states and port states and, with increasing cooperation 
between flag states and port states confrontation is not 
likely to occur.
B. A Liberian Perspective.
Liberia began its maritime program in 1948 supported by 
American interests primarily interested in tankers. The 
registry grew consistantly from that time until it peaked at 
over 81 million grt in 1978. Since then it has stabilized at 
about 51 million grt. Liberia has consistantly maintained 
the general policy that attracts shipowners to open 
registries and i^s continually adapting its laws and
regulations to the ever changing and demanding needs of the 
industry.^
Today, the Bureau of Marritime Affairs is headed by a 
Commissioner directly under the executive office of the 
President. This eliminates the risk of politizing the 
registry. Furthermore, the day to day operations are carried 
out by a private corporation based in the United States, 
under contract to the Government. Government appointed
Wiswall, F. L., Port State Control: What it is - How it works - Where it is going. Port State Control, Report of a Coinference, New York, Center for Seafarers Rights, April 2-4, 1986, at 6.
^ See, Smith, J., The Growth of Open Registries. World 
Shipping, Amsterdam, A Financial Times Int'1 Conf., Nov. 14- 15, 1989, at 15.2.
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Liberian Deputy Commsissioners perform senior administrative 
and ministerial tasks within the corporation. This system 
has proven its worth over the years as domestic political 
wranglings have not affected the registry- Liberia earned a 
net income of 18 million from the registry in 1989.
In a detailed treatise on a Liberian perspective on 
port state control Dr. Frank Wiswall outlines the basic 
legal notions regarding the traditional and contemporary 
development of port state jurisdiction with the conclusion 
that today it finds its basis in *'IMO originating safety 
legislation*' which flag states along can enforce in terms of 
the substantive provisions, but taking into consideration 
that the limited enforcement authority granted to port 
states by such legislation can only be exercised within the 
framework of the national law which is enacted for , that 
purpose.** Dr. Wiswall notes that Liberia's move 
toward enforcement of IMO originating safety legislation was 
prompted by public focus on the registry following the 
TORREY CANYON disaster in 1967, casualties of the OCEAN 
EAGLE in 1968 and the ARROW in 1969, as well as the 
ALLEGRO/PACIFIC GLORY collision in 1970.22
Following is a summary of some of the features of the
Liberian Safety Program.
r
The Liberian Sefety Inspection Program was inaugurated 
on May 8, 1971.2^ In 1974 the Marine Safety Department 
was created and Liberia began to properly enforce IMO 
orignating safety legislation. Presently, Liberia is a party 
to, and enforces all major IMO conventions. Liberia 
recognizes all major classification societies which are 
members of lACS. Any vessel dropped from class is
immediately suspended from the Registry. Today the Registry
21 Wiswall, Port State Control Enforcement, at 7. Dr. Wiswall was Admiralty Counsel for Liberia for over 20 years before retiring to private practice in 1989.
55** Ibid., at 8. See also, Carlisle, R., Sovereignty for Sale, Annapolis, Naval Inst. Press, 1981, at 175-76.
53 Ibid., at 9 et seq. The summary following is taken from Dr. Wiswall's paper, with updated information drawn from the author's own. association with the Liberian Bureau of Maritime Affairs.
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employs some 270 nautical inspectors worldwide, none of whom 
regularly work for the above mentioned societies. The 
inspectors report to regional safety offices in London, 
Rotterdam, Piraeus and Hong Kong. The computerized Safety 
Evaluation Division sorts all inspection reports and 
transmits results to agents and operators for any remedial 
action necessary. Also, advance notice is given to each 
vessel where ever trading to report to pre-designated ports 
along its routes for mandatory annual \ inspections. The age 
of the vessel and the type of trade it is engaged in will 
determine the frequency of interval inspections. The Safety 
Analysis Division constantly searches the computer for 
ususual safety difficulty and adjustments are made in 
anticipation of problems rather than after a casualty 
occurs. This system has been so successful that Liberia's 
safety record since the late 1970's has improved to the 
extend that the Liberian casualty record is today better 
than the world's average and Liberia has not been listed in 
the MOD list of detentions/ delays per flag exceeding the 
average percentage for the past five years.
Dr. Wiswall then turns his attention to two points from
which even the most efficient registry cannot escape. First,
no matter how finely tuned the infrastructure is there is
bound to be the presence of vessels which do not comply with
safety regulations because as long as so-called substandard
owners are around substandard vessels will continue to
infiltrate every flag state, including those with mighty
navies. ^Secondly, some flag states do not have
the administratiyjg__either for
politig.^.J,^QJUg.SjBSQmic reasons and where flag states lack
this ability it becomes necessary for port state control to
supplement and support the flag state in order to provide
more muscle in the drive for the uniform implementation of26international standards.
See, The MOU Annual Reports for the years 1984-88.
^ Wiswall, at 11. See also. Smith, J., at 15.3.
^ Mensah, T. Port State Control and Maritime Safety 
An IMO Perspective. Port State Control, Report of a Conference, New York, Center for Seafarers Rights, April 2- 4, 1986, at 26-27.
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It is, therefore the policy of Liberia to support the 
concept of port state control with non-discrimination as to 
flag. Being aware that its vast administrative and technical 
control network is not fool proof, Liberia has in place a 
Marine Investigation Division within the Marine Safety 
Department. All casualties of Liberian ships are by law 
investigated and formal inquiries are held in cases of loss 
of life, serious injury or serious damage, futhermore all 
investigations into marine casualties are published in 
compliance with SOLAS Chapter I Regulation 21 It has been 
suggested that aside from very serious casualties, no other 
government publishes casualty investigation reports in the 
regular press.^ Notices of violations submitted by 
port state authorities are also investigated 4pon receipt. 
Some reports are received through informal telephone
consular contacts while detentions are handled officially, 
either by direct consular contact or through diplomatic 
channels. Upon completion of all investigations the 
Commissioner issues a published decision with the report of 
the preliminary investigation attached. Action is then 
taken, in accordance with the national policy to remedy the 
situation and prevent further occurance. All information 
contained in a notice of deficiency from a port state 
authority is also' fed into the computer for proper record 
keeping. See Appendix VII for an exercise into a deficiency 
notice and follow-up action involving a Liberian flag 
vessel.
Liberia will continue tQ__suD.DQrt , port ■sJLaJLe...--c.Qntrol 
based on non-discrimination and will continue to cooperate 
with port state authorities as long as the exercise of port 
state Jurisdiction is not abused. Liberia considers port 
state control to be beneficial to the maritime world in this 
respect, but recognizes the need for other flag states to 
begin to exercise proper control over their vessels in order 
to create a proper balance in vessel safety and 
environmental pullution prevention regulation among ail flag 
states.^
^ Smith, at 15.3.
" Dr. Wiswall reaches the same conclusion at 11-12.
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CMAF^TEER V
LEGAL L I AB I L I TY I S S UES AF5 I S I MG 
EROM TME OETEMTIOM OE VESSELS
A. Civil Liability of Shipowner or Maritime Carrier for 
loss of or Damage to cargo as a result of Detention.
It is not the intent of this study to engage in a 
detailed discussion on the subject of the maritime carriage 
of goods nor the relation of marine insurance thereto. This 
chapter will only take a general look at some features of 
these two subjects in so far as liability for damages as a 
result of detention is concerned.
The basis for detaining a vessel as a result of port 
state control inspection lies in the type and extent of the 
deficiency found. If the deficiency is so serious and 
presents a threat to the safety of persons on board, for 
example, the vess^el may be detained until the dificiency is 
corrected which can take a few days. Although this time
frame is not very long there are instances when the
consignee of cargo carried on board may be adversely
affected as in the case of perishables ’and seasonal or 
holiday goods, which demand prompt delivery or else they rot 
or become useless.
Carriage of goods contracts like the Hague Visby 
Rules^ specify certain duties on the part of the 
carrier to make the vessel seaworthy and exclude certain
1 The International Convention for the Unification of certain rules of law relating to Bills of Lading, 1924, as amended by the Protocol of 1968, also know as the Hague- Visby Rules.
46
fortuitous events from liability therefor. The Hague-Visby 
Pules specify in Article IV paragraph 2 excepted perils for 
which "neither carrier nor the ship shall be responsible". 
Subparagraph (g) excepts "arrest or restraint of princes, 
rulers or people or seizure under legal process". This 
excepted peril appears to cover governmental actions such as 
port state control detention, and would thus leave a cargo 
owner without legal redress unless recovery can be had under 
some form of cargo insurance. Another loophole exists 
through which a possible claim could be brought. Article 
III subparagraph (a) imposes a duty on the carrier to 
exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy in all 
respects for the purpose for which it is intended to serve.
In addition, the holds, refrigeration system, cargo spaces, 
cargo handling equipment, crew and supplies must be fit for 
the intended purpose. If a substandard vessel is detained by 
reason of deficiencies and cannot fulfill its responsibility 
under the contract of carriage the liability provisions of 
the Hague Visby Rules, become operative.^ The
issues arising thereunder would be whether the cargo owner 
can recover damages for losses incurred by reason of the 
delay. Two points are of importance when dealing with this 
issue. First of all, the delay must be covered under the 
basis of liability of the Hague Visby Rules, and secondly 
there must be a neshjs between the loss and the deficiencies 
which rendered ' the vessel unseaworthy for the intended 
purpose.
In the first instance, it appears to be the case that 
such delay would fall into the category covered by the 
Rules, provided notice of the loss or damage is given the 
carrier or his agent at the port of discharge before delivery.^ In the second instance, the operative article is
2 The United Nations Convention on the carriage of goods by sea, 1978 also known as the Hamburg Rules, includes some similar provisions for assigning liability. The Convention is not yet in force.
^ Hague Visby Rules,. Art 6.
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Article 4. It provides that the carriers would not be liable 
for unseaworthiness related damages regarding the above 
specifed areas of the ship, except for want of due 
deligence; of course the burden of proof is on the person 
claiming the defense.^ In such a case there is not likely 
to be any question that the seaworthiness of the vessel led 
to the detention which caused the loss, but such cases hinge 
on proximate cause, and when two intervening causes are 
involved, the proximate cause must be the most immediate 
cause which is proximate in efficiency.® Except in cases of 
the most serious deficiencies, such as hull structural 
problems, the vessel is likely to seaworthy in respect of 
the holds, cargo spaces, etc., but deficient in so far as • 
navigational aids or ship's certificates are concerned. 
Under such circumstances, the most probable outcome in this 
case would be that the detention, not the unseaworthiness 
was the proximate cause of the loss. If however, proximate 
cause is established or the above excepted peril is found to 
be inapplicable, liability would then rest with the 
shipowner and the cost of operating a substandard ship would 
be borne by the real offender.
The purpose of assigning liability usualy includes, 
inter alia. the societal need to punish certain acts or 
omissions to act.'The rule of limitation of liability serves 
to ensure that the potential extent of some damage claims do 
not expose the shipowner to ruin, and insurance is the most 
common medium by which the shipowner protects his exposure 
to risk.^ Of course, situations do arise as evidenced by 
•‘exclusion clauses*’ of insurance contracts when the societal 
need to ptmish outweighs the industry's desire for
^ See, Chorleys and Giles, Shipping Law at 200-01 for a 
more detailed explanation of the intricacies of the applicability of this rule to the shipowner and the charterer.
® The MISS JAY JAY (1897) 1 Lloyds Rep. 32, at 39.
^ Limitation of Shipowner's Liability: The New Law. 
Institute of Int'l Law, Sweet And Maxwell, Ltd, 1986. at 163.
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shipowner's protection or when the cargo owner or a third 
intervening force is at fault.
Today, marine insurance schemes cover virtually every 
aspect of liability arising out of the ownership and 
operation of vessels. ^ The proponents of liability 
limitations argue that limitation does not cheat claimants. 
As for but the unscrupulous owner who fails to maintain his 
vessel and is simply cutting cost limitation proponents 
resist a linking of standards and limitation of liability by 
arguing:
Limitation is highly relevant to the 
insurance of shipowner's liabilities but 
it has little or no influence on ship 
standards; rather these are affected by 
changes in the international concensus 
on low ships should be run and the 
attitude, of the particular owner.®
What this assessment fails to take into consideration 
is that there does exist, however, a close connection 
between the consequences of substandard operation and 
limitation, especially when the amount of the claims exceed 
the limits. Take the grounding of The EDQCON VALDEZ for 
example. The EXXON VALDEZ cannot be said to be s^ubstandard 
although one might be tempted to argue that the fact that 
the accident occured is evidence -that the vessel was 
substandard. In any event, simply focusing on the claims, 
the various relevant international conventions on shipowner 
liability which would otherwise bind Exxon provides for 
incurable limits of One Hundred Sixty-Six Million Dollars 
plus Seventy-Five Million Dollars in supplements, while the
7 Taken from ICOD/WMU, International Maritime Law Basic Principles, Lecture Notes and Materials Compiled by Edgar Gold, Jerzy Mlynarczyk, Maritime Law Course June 16-22 1969. P. 610.
Limitation of Shipowners Liability: The New Law, atB163-64.
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Exxon VALDE2 claims are likely to be in the Billions of 
Dollars when it is finally settled. The Question which hunts 
the industry is, "what if that accident involved a small 
single ship company?" The obvious answer is that society 
will be saddled with an unacceptably high cost not only for 
the clean-up but also for the extensive loses suffered by 
the people of valdez.
This is not meant to * be construed as an argument in 
favor of higher limits or unlimited liability, it is simply 
meant to under score the broader scope of a problem the 
proponents of limitations ignore. The substandard owner 
keeps his operation afloat by selecting the cheapest way to 
make a profit, that is to operate a substandard ship. Such 
owners will continue to undercut more responsible owners and 
put lives and the environment at unnessary risk. The easing 
of the legal burden on cargo owners plus the extention to 
shipowners of liability arising out of port state control 
detention will increase the cost to substandard owners and 
could be another weapon, albeit from the commercial side, in 
the battle against substandard ships.
B. Liability of the Port State for Loss of or Damage to 
Cargo as a result of Detention.
A subject which appears to be very sensitive to port 
state control inspectors is, "what if a vessel is unduly 
detained and I suffer a loss, can I recover monetary damages 
under your Law?" Chapter II discussed the legal regimes 
which gave rise to port state control and its legal 
enforcement. Inherent in the right of the coastal or port 
state is the right to regulate the safe navigation of its 
territorial sea and inland waterways. The acts employed by 
the port state in this respect are sovereign by their very 
nature, however, the extent of the states-right to regulate 
shipping has been restricted in the sense that international 
conventions which authorize the port state to exercise 
control over ships generally provide that the port state 
should apply the provisions of those conventions to foreign 
flag vessels in such a way that no more favorable treatment
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is given to such vessels. Additionally, a prohibition 
against undue delay is provided. The issue which then arises 
is whether the violation of this prohibition is ground for a 
shipowner or cargo owner to cover monetary damages. Article 
232 of UNCLOS provides in pertinent part that states shall
be liable for damage or loss arising from enforcement
measures when those measures exceed reasonably required 
action in light of the available information. Additionally, 
the Article requires states to "provide for recourse in
their courts for actions in respect of such damage or loss" 
Although the Convention is not yet in force, the provision 
is a clear indication of the concern states have for the 
necessity of safeguards to protect against wrongful 
detentions. The provision is also a modern day manifestation 
of the limitation of the sovereignty concept even as it 
relates to the jurisdiction of states over their territorial 
seas and internal waters.Notwithstanding this requirement 
for legal recourse, some states exercising port state
control have instituted an appeal process where the master 
of a ship might be in disagreement with an inspector's 
decision. The UK provdes this appeal mechanism in the 
Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 section 460. The United States 
Coast Guard has an appeal process which allows the master to 
go all the way to the Commandant of the Coast Guard.
The MOU does not ■provide for an appeal process because the 
enforcement aspect is left to the individual administrations 
and it is theirresponsibi1ity to provide this appeal 
mechanism. One thing is certain, though, in most cases the 
length of detentions 3.mount to only a few days and the only 
immediate cost is that of rectifying the deficiency. In 
contrast, an appeal may run a few extr.a days and the costs 
would be even higher. The logical tiding to do then is to 
simly comply and get it over with.
For such short term detentions and long term 
detentions to rectify wha.t,may be wrongly construed as major
a Robinson, Cpt. J., Practical Aspects of Enforcement of Safety. Safety in Shipping, Hamburg, BIMCO General Meeting, May 29, 1989, at 9-10.
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deficiencies the possibility of recovering damages for 
losses incurred is not only more attractive than the 
administrative appeal process, it is more important as well. 
Of course this is aside from the fact that some 
jurisdictions require the exhaustion of administrative 
remedies before resorting to the judiciary. Because of the 
differencies in the two types of remedies sought and the 
competence to provide these remedies it is important that 
states take cognizance of the need for legal recourse in 
cases of loss of or damage to cargo as a result of 
detention.
Port state control authorites would undoubtedly oppose 
such a move by arguing it would cause inspectors to hold 
back on their professional judgm&nt in difficult cases. Also 
if there were an influx of claimants to the courts port 
state control inspectors would have to acquire the second 
skill of technical witnesses in a flood of cases.
These are undeniably serious concerns but they are not 
enough to justify the denial of the right of recourse where 
there is a ligitimate claim. First of all port state control 
should be remedial, not punitive. If this is the case then 
the process should be open enough for mistakes and undue 
delays to be botl^ corrected and compensated. As it stands 
now all the duties rest with the ship and that can be 
construed by the unscrupulous inspector as a carte blanc to 
do whatever he pleases. There is no doubt that in a right of 
recourse jurisdiction inspectors will be more dedicated in 
the exercise of their duties. At the same time those 
inspectors who already maintain the highest degree of 
professionalism would see no need to change. In cases where 
the enforcement is so stringent so as to make it punitive, 
there would be a need to normalize the enforcement in an 
effort to reflect the requirements of the convention. 
Secondly, port state control inspectors already or should 
already be experts in their craft and the call to testify in 
court would not constitute any undue burden on them. Indeed, 
in some jurisdictions, the people responsible for port state 
control have additional duties for which they may be legally
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liable. For example, in the United States, the Federal Tort 
Claims Act and the suits in Admiralty Act provide the basis 
for actions against the Coast Guard which range from the 
Coast Guard's failure to maintain navigation lights to its 
standard of care to ensure that vessels are safe for 
navigation. Surely, the potential liability of the Coast 
Guard in the exercise of its other duties, have not reduced, 
but rather enhanced its performance of those duties, and 
port state control is no different. The possibility of the 
right of recourse becoming a floodgate for court actions is 
diminished by the fact that the more rationally remedial the 
inspection process becomes, the less likely are there to be 
legal challenges to the inspector's decisions.
The right of recourse provision in UNCLOS is a 
pragmatic move to ensure that the port state remain 
responsible in the exercise of its rights under both 
customary international law and the conventions giving rise 
to port state control. It is only fair and proper that 
states heed this restriction on their severeignty and 
provide the means for this recourse to be easily exercised 
because in the final analysis everyone bears part
responsibility for the international effort to improve the 
standards of ships and everyone stands to benefit from a 
balanced application of those standards.
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955); and U.S. v. Gahagan Dredging Corp, 289 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1961).
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CHAF^TEFl VI
F'UTURE: trhzmds in i=ort state control
A. The Current Success of Port State Control.
When Port State Control was introduced in Europe in 
1982, it was suspiciously viewed by some parts of the 
industry while others whole heartedly welcomed it. The real 
assessors of port state control are the shipowners, 
seafarers and labor organizations, and affected flag states.
Of course port state control authorities have taken the lead 
in an overall positive assessment of the concept, with a 
general acquiescence from shipowners.
Initially, the International Shipowners Association 
(INSA) condemned it as illegal and detrimental to shipping 
interests.^ INSA's reasons were undoubtedly linked to the 
economic benefits shipowners inure under the open registry 
system. However, a few years earlier, the reaction of 
American shipowners was the opposite when the United States 
Coast Guard introduced the unilateral tanker boarding 
program following the 1977 ARGO MERCHANT casualty, calling 
it a necessary means to supplement flag state control.^
This endorsement was limited to cover safety matters and 
marine pollution prevention, and did not extend to ILO 147 
related control. American Shipowners immediately saw the 
potential destructiveness of port state control by 
contrasting safety and pollution related conventions which 
are relatively easy to administer, with the more subjective
^ Kasoulides, G., Paris Memorandum of Understanding: Six
Years of Enforcement. 20 Marine Pollution Bulletin 255 (1989)-, at 260.
2 Loree, P., Port State Control: A Shipowner Perspective.Port State Control, Report of a Conference. New York, Center for Seafarers Rights, April 2-4, 1986, at 31.
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ILO 147, which leaves inspectors in their discretion to 
consider whether conditions such as food quality, shipboard 
living conditions and exploitation of crew are deficiencies 
which may be deemed harzardous to the crew's health and 
safety.^ Today, European shipowners probably agree 
with their American counterparts in light of the economic 
motivaing factors which brought the various interested 
European parties close enough to successfully launch port 
state control. The problem of ILO 147 continues to loom
over an otherwise favorable prognosis, particularly in the 
United States where that Convention will be included in the 
Coast Guard inspection program. In Europe, the MDO was 
further amended in 1989 for the purpose of enforcing ILO 
147, and guidelines for the inspection of vessels were 
inserted in the accompanying annex. The new amendments 
cover articles of agreement, repatriation of seamen,
shipowner's liability and trade union rights, but the 
failure of the vessel to be covered is not a detainable 
offense and may only be referred to the flag state with a 
copy to the ILO.’ Although this action will not alleviate 
all of the concerns of shipowners regarding interpretation 
of the Convention it will not dampen shipowners enthusiasm 
about port state control, in general. INTERTANKO, another 
shipowners organization which welcomed port state control 
when it was intr^oduced in Europe in 1983, has gone even 
further to urge states to ratify and enforce the relevant 
safety conventions.®
In contrast, labor projects a different view of port 
state control in so far as ILO 147 is concerned. Port state 
control, in its entirety is beneficial to seafarers because 
the safety conventions as well as ILO 147 have a direct 
bearing on the crew's health and welfare. The pollution 
prevention conventions also have a strong bearing on crew
® Ibid., at 32-33.
^ Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control
Secretariat letter ref S/MP- 10.048/89 and attachments. Annex 4.7 et seq.
® Rafgard, T., Tanker Safety and Implementation of
International Conventions, Trans I MarE<C), vol.97, Conf. I, Paper 14, at 104.
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safety although it could be argued that there is less of a 
direct effect where the marine environment is concerned. In 
any event, while labor praise port state control in so far 
as the campaign against substandard ships is concerned, they 
do not give high enough ratings where their chief concern, 
that is the enforcement of ILO 147, lies. ILO 147 is a 
complex convention for port state control purposes. It is 
an umbrella convention which provisions can only be 
satisfied by the implementation of the provisions of several 
other conventions contained in its annex. These include 
minimum age, medical examination, accident prevention, 
accomodation of crews, qualifications of crew, medical care 
and benefits, food and catering, articles of agreement, 
repatriation and trade union rights. The first five 
categories fall within the realm of the technical safety 
related matters on board, which in some cases overlap with 
other existing safety conventions and can be easily enforced 
and interpreted. The others relate to the internal 
management of the ship's affairs and are considered too 
subjective for port state control enforcement. With regard 
to these categories of ILO 147 seafarers have indicated 
their disappointment^ As discussed above, the enforcement 
of social ,_jgelfare r.ejaiil.aiJ,.Qns is a very difficult exercise, 
and the fact that the MDO states only came to agreement on 
ILO social provisions in 1989 - more than ten years after 
that convention sparked off European port state control with 
the Hague Memorandum - is proof of the’scope of this issue. 
The concerns of the shipowners regarding ILO 147 were not 
enough to deter them from supporting its adoption inl976.^ 
Similarly, these concerns cannot be viewed as sufficient to 
resist its enforcement in port state control today. All the 
benefits said to inure to the shipowner as a result of port 
state control, i.e., improvement of ship's safety, uniform 
enforcement of international regulations and potentially 
less frequent boardings for inspection, also benefit the
Sorenson, K. Mols, The Seafarers and ILO Convention 147. Port State Control, Report of a Conference, New York, Center for Seafarers Rights, April 2-4, 1986, at 24.
^ Ibid.,at 23.
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crew without added cost or inconvenience to the shipowner.®
The only lack of attention given to ILO 147 by port states, 
particularly the MOU states, is in relation to the social 
welfare provisions and this will probably change with the 
1989 amendments. Until then labor will continue to be 
dissatisfied with the success level of port state control.
Flag states responded to European and unilateral port 
state control with mixed emotions. Those flag states with 
control infrastructures welcomed port state control as a 
complementary mechanism to their own enforcement. Other 
flag states which have done little to enforce international9standards were vehement in their objection to it.
All flag states, however, were affected by Dr Wiswall's 
eloquently demonstrated non-discrimination caveat which was 
discussed in Chapter. IV supra. Today, with the wider
acceptability of port state control, particularly with 
shipowners organizations move flag states have accepted the 
inevitable.
In so far as the non-discrimination caveat is concerned 
port state control .figures, particularly in Europe, have 
shown that from the outset the MOU states have upheld their 
commitment to apply port state control without 
discrimination aa to flag. Unfortunately, this does not 
invalidate the concerns of open registries because although 
the movement against substandard ships is increasingly 
successful, the other conditions which prompted European 
port state control remain. With the exception of Norway,
Europe is still struggling with, its., shipping business 
because the economic pressure, from cheaper and more 
efficient competitors is still strong, environmental
® Mensah, T., Port State Control and Maritime Safety, An 
IMO Perspective, Port State Control, Report of a Conference, New York, Center for Seafarers Rights, April 2-4, 1966, at 27.
0 Kasoulides, at 257, and Huibers, Safe Transport ofDangerous Goods by Sea - Promoted by Control in Port. Speech delivered to the 9th Annual Symposium on the Transport andHandling of Dangerous Goods by Sea and Inland Waterways,Rotterdam, 1987, at 442-3.
See Huibers, at 443.
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awareness is even more dictating political and economic 
events, and the continued internationalization of business 
and politics is still affecting Europe's relative strength 
in world shipping. As the MOU states and unilateral 
port state control authorities move* toward the total 
implementation of ILO 147 developing flag states and open 
registries, especially those refusing to accept ITF demands 
will be at even greater risk for discrimination, which could
lead to a loss of confidence in the integrity of port state
control. The only solution to this potentially explosive 
situation is greater commitment on the part of MOU states 
and unilateral port state control authorities to enforce ILO 
147 in the strictest sense, that is to exercise the 
absolutely limited authority granted by Article 4, and 
report related deficiencies to flag states instead of
exercising control over the internal management of the 
ship's affairs.
The fourth assessors of the success of port state
control are the enforcing authorities themselves. When the 
MOU was signed in 1982 its goal was to harmonize port state 
control inspections among the fourteen states and to target 
25% of all foreign flag vessels calling at MOU ports within 
a twelve month period thus leading to a region wide 100% 
coverage. Revised estimates for 1986 showed only on 18.2% 
inspection percentage with 70% coverage.^ Nevertheless, 
the MOU Secretariat interpreted these figures to show:
It is a satisfactory development that 
the contributions of the individual port 
States to the summarized inspection 
percentage of 16.2% continve to 
equalize, so that the inspection efforts 
per participating Maritime Authority are gradually 'balancing out'.^^
For the same period under review the number of
Tintz, M., Port State Control versus Marine Pollution. 16 Maritime Pol. Mgmt. 189 (1989), at 191.
MOU on PSC Annual Report 1988, at 20.
Ibid.
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deficiencies decreased and, apparently based on the 
reduction of individual ships calling at MOU ports the 
number of inspections also decreased.Despite 
the confusing numbers the MOU authorities say they are 
successful. They refer to the change in tone from the 
skeptics with phrases such as "regionalistic policy" and 
"that gloomy sounding phenomenon" to an acknowledgement that 
port state control is, after all "not superfluous."^^
Also the MOU authorities note that the industry is now 
largely supportive and other flag states have requested 
statistical information and other publications.^^
The failure to reach its targets have been blamed on lack of 
human resources and inadequacy of data processing by some 
members which is being alleviated but more significantly 
defects are being detected.One conclusion as to the 
success of the MOU indicated a "thinning" of the substandard 
ship from Europe.^® If this conclusion is true then it is 
possible that this thinning is a result of flight of 
substandard ships from Europe and not necessarily an 
improvement in overall world shipping standards. In any 
event, the MOU partners are undoubtedly aware that all 
substandard ships have not been banned from Europe,
therefore, more needs to be done to ensure that there is a 
steady decline in the number of detentions.
t'
This can only be attained through the globalization of 
port state control with increased cooperation between 
enforcement authorities and- the creation of more port state 
control networks under the auspices of the IMO.
See Apppendix V <i>.
Huibers, at 443.
Maier, S., Port State Control - Does it Work? Money and Ships in the City. Barbican Centre, Seatrade Conference, March 20-22, 1985, at 116.
Newbery. R., Implementation of Port State Control. Excerpts from a paper delivered to the Honorable Company of Master Mariners, October 10, 1964, at 123-4.
Ibid, at 124.
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B. Cooperation between Port State Control Authorities.
A number of other countries are currently undertaking 
port state control inspections of various kinds, most 
notably the United States, Canada, Australia and Japan. 
Each of these states operate under varying forms of 
legislative authority with different degrees of enforcement 
capabilities. Shortly after its inception, the MOU partners 
saw the need to establish a form of cooperation with other 
maritime authorities and in 1984 exchange of information 
began with Japan, followed by the United States Coast Guard in 1986 and the Canadian Coast Guard in 1987.^ The 
form of the cooperation usually include exchange of 
information regarding port state control guidelines, 
inspection reports, reciprocal participation in seminars, 
conferences, technical meetings, etc.^*
There is also a need for an extension of this form of
cooperation between the MOU partners and other maritime
authorities as well, because there is a recognized need for
port state control to extend beyond Europe and North America
to the oil ports of the Middle East as well as African,
27Asian, Carribean and Latin American ports. This is
extremely important- in view of the fact that any decline of 
substandard ships from one region of the world which is 
merely the result of flight to another region does not aid 
in the improvement of world standards. In order to move 
toward a global concerted effort to eliminate substandard 
ships, port state control networks must be set up in other 
regions, thus weaving a tighter noose around the necks of 
substandard owners. When virtually every port state is part 
of a network substandard ships will likely disappear. Of 
course the effective implementation of such a global scheme 
depends on a harmonized plan of action based on
Kasoulides, at 260.
^ MOU on PSC Annual Report 1988, at 4-5.
Kasoulides, at 260.
^ Ibid. See also, Rafgard, at 104.
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internationally acceptable standards.
C. The Regionalization of Port State Control under the 
Auspices of the IMO.
Presently, two basic forms of port state control 
infrastructure exist. There is the unilateral model which 
accomodates the United States strict enforcement and 
regional port state control in the form of the MOU. Both 
forms have advantages and disadvantages which do not 
coincide. For example unilateral control is not concerned 
with the difficult task of harmonization or extensive 
cooperation. On the other hand regional control does not 
require a massive infrastructure nor the accompanying high 
budgetary costs. Only countries controlling significant 
proportions of the world seaborne trade, such as the United 
States, can afford to implement strict unilateral control 
without losing significant amount of its trade. Still, 
unilateral control invites arbitrarily imposed regulations 
which go beyond accepted international conventions and can 
"cause retaliatory action". ^ In any event, unilateral 
control authorities will likely seek cooperation with other 
authorities as has been the case with the United States 
Coast Guard and the MOU partners. The choice for other 
maritime authorities, particularly developing countries, 
clearly lies in the form of regional networks. Each such 
network should develop on its own, taking into account its 
own needs. Although the MOU format is a good basis for this 
purpose it need not be copied vebatim. The first phase in 
this process involves those parties already participating in 
or currently developing port state control. They need to 
come together in an informal forum to discuss ways of 
Implementing port state control on a regional basis under 
the auspices of the IMO.^^ The IMO must at all times 
be the central link in this process because the object will 
always remain the cooperation of the various parties and the 
harmonization of the standards, all of which, apart from ILO 
147. originated in the IMO. The IMO has constantly set the
^ Huibers, at 444.
24 Kasoulides reaches the same conclusion, at 261.
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pace for the uniform enforcement of the standards set by the 
international conventions and is best suited as a forum 
where port state control authorities can work together to 
ensure that the relevant instruments are being uniformally 
interpreted to prevent discriminatory or incompetent 
application of the standards.^
The global application of the standards is the goal of 
both the IMO and those who enforce the regulations. This 
being the case, one could then argue*that full harmonization 
can only be attained under one international port state 
control network with the IMO as the international control 
center. Unfortunatelythere are two inherent fallacies in 
this approach. First of all, the IMO is not an inter­
governmental regulatory body charged with the responsibility 
of enforcing international standards, and port state 
control, though recognized by the IMO as an effective 
complement to flag state control,is being success- 
successfully enfoced by port states themselves. Secondly, 
harmonization is only as effective as the size of the 
harmonizers. For example, the MOU partners are a small
group of sovereign states covering the small geographical 
area of Western Europe and, although the MOU is open to new 
members, they recognize that harmonization is already a 
major concern for' the members, so instead of expanding, 
which is in itself a worthwhile thought, they chose the path 
of cooperation and exchange of information with other 
authorities while insisting that the IMO play a pivotal role 
in the setting of standards,-which will ensure that no one
region takes a different position from the rest of the IMO 
57member states. ‘
Invariably, one of the major items on any agenda for 
the establishment of regional port state control networks 
will be the lack of ratification of the relevant 
international conventions by developing countries. but this 
should not be seen as a stiffling factor for the networks.
^ Mensah, at 27.
^ Ibid.
Maier , at 133 .
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It could even lead to an advantage for the networks because 
the various national regimes to be set up would be based on 
a harmonized approach from the start. Once the region is 
identified and the network created, the participants must 
then sit down and address the important technical and other 
requirements and adopt a "realistic and pragmatic approach" 
which would most certainly lead to the speedy ratification 
of the relevant instruments.^
The second phase in the process is the task of
identifying the various regions for the networks. Again, 
this shows the importance of using the IMO as the central
link because the members of the IMO comprise virtually
every, port state and the members account for over 96% of 
the worlds tonnage. Although the IMO does not sponsor 
regional affiliations at its meetings, it has cooperated 
with other organizations such as UNCTAD which do and that 
helps add to the possible choices. The easiest way is to 
look for existing regional economic cooperation groups such 
as CARRICOM in the Carribean Sea area or maritime
cooperation groups such as the Ministerial Conference of 
West and Central African States on Maritime Transport 
(MINCOMAR). Another possibility might be to identify 
certain sea routes, which run along a series of national 
coastlines. This/ latter approach appears to be the picture 
rationale of the MOU because if a line were to be drawn from 
Scandinavia to the Mediterranean virtually every port in 
that part of the Western hemisphere would fall under the 
MOU. Once a decision is made as to the delineation of the 
various "International Control Regions" steps must be taken 
to ensure that the number of participants in the regional 
network do not exceed a reasonable number. Of course, in 
keeping with the spirit of the Law of the Sea Convention 
(UNCLOS) those landlocked states whose economies depend on
® Kasoulides at 261. Kasoulides recognized that once the 
participants agreed on their plan of action each was eager to push for the ratification of the relevant conventions. In comparison, other types of such moves have occurred as in the case of Liberia which ratified the Facilitation of Maritime Traffic Convention years ago but did not implement it until a very successful seminar was held in Monrovia in 1989 which showed how easily the standard forms could be assimilated into the existing national regulatory framework at little extra cost to Government, and made everyone's work a little easier.
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the use of certain ports should be invited to participate in 
a reasonable manner in the control of vessels carrying cargo 
for trans-shipment to or from such states.
The next phase involves the choice of the form of 
agreement the participants will adopt and the framework for 
implementing the agreement. International law presupposes 
the right of states to enter into practically any type of 
agreement with other states. This includes the signing of 
formal treaties, memoranda of understanding, as well as 
communiques loosely calling for agreement on certain 
subjects. Different states have different national
requirements as to what form their bilateral and 
multilateral agreements should adopt. Therefore, it is 
conceivable that the networks will possibly have varying 
grants of authorization. However, this should not hamper 
the ability of the authorities involved to function without 
interference. Similarly, no such agreement should create 
new regulations outside the framework of the existing 
relevant conventions nor should any additional regulations 
be imposed on the participants than that authorized by the 
relevant conventions.^ For the purpose of uniformity and 
harmonization the relevant instruments for all regional 
networks must be those instruments already recognized by the 
IMO and the ILO.^i.e., SOLAS 74; SOLAS Protocol of 78; 
MARPOL 73, 78; STOW 78; COLREGS 72, Load Lines 66; and ILO 147?® In addition, the agreement should provide 
for the extent of authority of the participants undertaking 
inspection procedures and authorized action regarding 
deficiencies including detention, a reporting system, 
organizational structure, etc. These provisions are also 
basic to the MOU but they are the basis for its
implementation.
The final phase in the process is the implementation, 
record keeping and data intercharge. In this phase several 
items need to be addressed. First of all each participating 
authority should identify possible surveyors who should have
^ Huibers, at 434.
^ Ibid.
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IMO recommended levels of professional training or 
experience in shipboard affairs. Special training would 
undoubtedly be required through the • central link and 
periodic seminars for surveyors should be organized. 
Training can take on several fronts from sending surveyors 
to port state control Courses abroad to bringing in 
technical experts. Next, each network should establish a 
small secretariat for the sole purpose of record keeping and 
coordinating the activities of the network. The choices 
range from the MOU style with one partner providing the 
secretariat to a mutually funded secretariat. In light of 
the dismal record of mutually funded regional projects the 
latter should be avoided. There is even the possibility of 
rotating the secretariat, but that could lead to some 
confusion and lack of continuity. All that the participants 
need to communicate with the secretariat is a telephone and 
a telex machine. Telefax and computer link-ups are
excellent ideas but may not be easily obtained at the 
outset. The secretariat should have a computer which could 
be connected to the central link ideally located in a small 
room at the IMO headquarters. Numerous software exist that 
could easily be adapted to the secretariat's needs and this 
should be explored by competent experts. Finally, the 
central link should be as easily accessible as possible to 
ensure that each? secretariat can transmit or receive
information from other secretariats and from the central 
link as well.
The overriding concern of most countries today relate 
to budgetary constraints and that is the main attraction of 
regional port state control. The relatively small number of 
participants involved, the use of personnel already 
performing important tasks in the national infrastructure 
plus the methods of processing and exchanging information at 
low costs is a good incentive for administrations with 
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CONCLUSION
Port State Control in Europe was made possible by 
economic and environmental concerns which were stiffling 
European shipping. The decision to move against substandard 
shipping, though prompted by the above concerns, was 
necessary to aid in the international effort to clean up the 
oceans and make the seas safer. Consequently, it was 
necessary for states to find a mechanism through which port 
states could exercise their jurisdiction to control foreign 
flag vessels and enforce the provisions of those relevant 
international conventions and protocols which establish 
minimum standards for ships. As always, this jurisdiction 
would supplement flag state jurisdiction, not r'eplace it, 
and port state control would be the mechanism for this 
enf orcement.
International law has always recognized the sovereign 
jurisdiction of coastal or port states over their 
territorial sea arid internal waters. Hence, the inclusion 
of the "no more favorable treatment" clause in maritime 
safety and pollution prevention conventions, beginning in 
1973 with MARPOL was the most convenient means to enable 
port states to exercise control. But this control is not 
absolute. The conventions clearly state the extent to which 
control may be exercised over foreign flag vessels, and, 
with the exception of ILO 147. such control may not extend 
to the internal management of the ship's affairs. In 
addition, MARPOL 73,78, SOLAS 74 and the protocol of 1978, 
and the STCW'78 provide for compensation to be paid for 
undue delay. The UNCLOS also provides for this compensation 
by calling for a right of recourse in the courts of the port 
state exercising this control.
In nearly ten years of operation European port state 
control has been accepted by those who are affected by it 
and it is considered successful. Similarly, American port
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state control is also considered successful. Although the 
figures generated by the MOU - members do not cover a long 
enough period for proper evaluation, a number of 
observations were made to support the above conclusions.
The greater percentage of ships calling at European 
ports were "regional" but the total number include vessels 
from all parts of the world. The serious deficiencies 
appear to involve vessels from developing countries; the 
open registry record is mixed with some open registries, 
like Liberia, showing exceptionally good records; and there 
is no real indication from the figures indicating a flight 
of substadard ships from Europe to other areas simply 
because of the confidentiality of such information.^
Also, in terms of the political and technical
ef f ect ivenfijs.s-- oi:—nor t s t a t e control, the widespread
acceptance of the concept demonstrates its global political 
success, while on the other hand, the failure of the MOU to 
achieve. i-ts—n.na 1—indicates a need to address the problems 
associated with the regional fleet as well as the practical effects of the MOU on trading patternsT^ The MOU partners 
.recognize their limitations and aim to improve their 
performance record as well as intensify their cooperation * *
with other maritime authorities and organizations with a 
view to worldwide enforcement.^
Other weaknesses pointed out regarding port state 
control in general include the failure of flag states to 
taXg appropriate action when advised by port states, the 
inability of the inspector to look to the structural 
strength of vessels and the obligation of the inspector to 
accept the licences and certificates of officers and crew
* Kasoulides, G., Paris Memorandum of Understanding: Six
Years of Regional Enforcement. 20 Marine Pollution Bulletin 255 <1989), at 259.
9 Tintz, M., Port State Control versus Marine Environmental Pollution. 16 Maritime Pol. Mgmt. 189 <1989), at 205-06.
^ Huibers, H., Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Sea - 
Promoted by Control in Port. Speech delivered to the 9th Annual Symposium on the Transport and Handling of Dangerous Goods by Sea and Inland Waterways, Rotterdam, 1987, at 431.
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issued by flag states without having the ability to check 
the varacity of such documents.^ Furthermore, budgetary 
constraints faced by maritime authorities responsible for 
port state control, particularly in the case of unilateral 
control, may ^hamper the eff icJ^iiEyL..,..,j^^ enforcement
effort.
The most pragmatic solution to the above problems is 
the regionalization of port state control under the auspices 
of the IMO, Admittedly, the skeletal structure proposed in 
Chapter VI does not represent a firm enough framework for 
the implementation of regional port state control. However 
it is a starting point for the discussions which would lead 
to the creation of the appropriate models for each region to 
follow. /Regionalization takes advantage of the collective 
strength usually found in many international undertakings. 
Furthermore, under regionalization the individual costs are 
reasonably low since the control mechanism is absorbed into 
an already existing maritime framework, and the individual 
partners can focus on the limited functions ascribed by the 
conventions while sharing the cost of the information 
system. Furthermore, regionalization will lead to greater 
participation by virtually all flag states which in most 
cases are also port states, in the improvement of standards. 
Flag states, including those operating open or second 
registers, will begin to develop a keener view of their 
responsibilities and the efforts of the regionlization plan 
would be greatly enhanced.
/‘^’^V^en all flag states begin to participate in regional 
! port state control, the fear of retaliatory action will be 
( diminished and port state control may become so effective,
I that the elimination of the substandard ship will become a 
\reality. Once achieved, port state control may become 
unnecessary. Until then, it remains a viable mechanism 
through which flag state control can be supplemented by 
port states.
^ Smith, J., 
delivered to the lUMI Loss Prevention by Regulation. Conference, Antwerp, 1989, at 3-4 Speech
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Adopted on 19 November 1981 
Agenda kern 10(b)
PROCEDURES FOR THE CONTROL OF SHIPS
THE ASSEMBLY.
RECALLING Aaicfe 16(i) of the Convention on the Inter-Governmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization.
adopted by resolution A.321 (IX) Procedures for the 
Regulation 19 of Chapter I of the International Convention for the Safety 
of Life at Sea, 1960. and Article 21 of the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966,
NOTING that the Maritime Safety Committee as requested in resolution A 321 (IX) 
(MSC/arc 219^''"'^''^ "Sub-standard Ships; Guidelines on Control Procedures"
ct . ^^^CALLING ALSO that with resolution A.390(X) it had urged Governments of flag 
States to submit information about action taken in respect of ships entitled to fly the flaq of
Com-en^ionr'^^ complying fully with the requirements of the above
3^ a" with maritime safety standards prescribed by relevant conventions, ^
HAVING NOTED the continuous work of the Maritime Safety Committee on the subiect
SteTnmmZnl r T ** guidelines, with reference to
the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974,
_ HAVING CONSIDERED the recommendation made by the Maritime 
at Its forty-third session. Safety Committee
1. adopts the improved Procedures for the Control of Ships and Guidelines thereto 
contamed m the Annex to this resolution, which supersedes the texts set out in the AnnJx to 
resolution A.32KIX) and in MSC/Circ.219; • ®
2. INVITES Member Governments and Contracting Governments 
Conventions to implement the improved Procedures and Guidelines; to the aforementioned
3. REQUESTS Governments concerned to provide information on;
(a)
(b)
controlling functions under the relevant
Conventions and when necessary to update the information previously submitted;
Action taken in respect of ships found to be deficient in relation to the above 
Conventions in their role as either port or flag State Government;
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4. REQUESTS the Maritime Safety Committee to continue its work on this subject with a view 
to improving the Procedures and Guidelines further as may be necessary and progressively to 
extend these to cover:
(a) The Protocol of 1978 relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at 
Sea, 1974;
(b) The forthcoming amendments to the 1974 SOLAS Convention; and
(c) Any new conventions;
when experience has been gained with these instruments; -
5. FURTHER REQUESTS the Secretariat to update when necessary the information from 
Member countries on inspection services available domestically and abroad, for circulation to 
Governments concerned.
ANNEX
PROCEDURES FOR THE CONTROL OF SHIPS
1 Introduction
1.1 Under the provisions of the applicable International Convention for the Safety of Life at 
Sea and the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966, the Administration (i.e. the Govern­
ment of the flag State) is responsible for promulgating laws and regulations and for taking all other 
steps which may be necessary to give these Conventions full and complete effect so as to ensure 
that, from the point of view of safety of life, a ship is fit for the sea'ice for which it is intended.
1.2 In some cases it may be difficult for the Administration to exercise full and continuous 
control over some ships entitled to fly the flag of its State, for instance those ships which do not 
regularly call at a port of the flag State. The problem can be, and has been, partly overcome by . 
appointing inspectors at foreign ports or authorizing.classification societies to act on behalf of 
the flag State Administration.
1.3 The following control procedures should be regarded as complementary to national
' measures taken by Administrations of fla^g States in their countries and abroad and are intended 
to assist flag State Administrations in securing compliance with convention provisions in safe­
guarding the safety of crew, passengers and ships.
1.4 The procedures are intended to apply to ships which come under the provisions of the 
applicable International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea and the International Conven­
tion on Load Lines, 1966.
1.5 Port States should carry out control of ships of non-convention countries and of ships below 
convention size, but deficiency reports should be submitted to the Administration of the country 
concerned and not to the Organization.
1.6 Deficiency reports under the Memorandum of Understanding between certain maritime 
Administrations or any similar agreement should not be sent to the Organization except if 
related to IMCO conventions and in conformity with the present procedure.
2 General
2.1 Regulation 19 of Chapter I of the applicable International Convention for the Safety of Life 
at Sea, and Article 21 of the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966, provide for control 
procedures to be followed by the Contracting Governments with regard to foreign ships visiting 
their ports. The authorities of port States should make effective use of these provisions for the 
purposes of identifying deficiencies, if any, in such ships which may render them sub-standard 
(see 3.1) and ensuring that remedial measures are taken. Such control may be initiated either:
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.1 by a visit of a control officer of the port State to verify that there are on board valid 
certificates; or
.2 on the basis of information regarding a sub-standard ship submitted to the authorities 
of the port State in accordance with the procedures under section 4.
2.2 Contracting Governments should be aware that whereas they may entrust inspection and 
survey either to surveyors nominated for this purpose or to organizations recognized by them, 
it is preferable that the right to board and inspect ships for the purposes of control and the 
power to detain them should be implemented by government inspectors including those 
surveyors of the classification societies who, in practice, act as government officials of the port 
State.
2.3 Guidelines on control procedures are given in Appendix 1.
3 Identification of a sub-standard ship
3.1 In general, a ship is regarded as sub-standard:
3.1.1 if the hull, machinery or equipment such as for life-saving, radio and fire-fighting are 
below the standards required by the relevant Convention, owing to, inter alia;
.1 the absence of equipment or arrangement required by the conventions;
.2 non-compliance of equipment or arrangement with relevant specifications of the 
Conventions;
.3 substantial deterioration of the ship or its equipment because of, for example, poor 
maintenance; and
3.1.2 if these evident factors as a whole or individually make the ship unseaworthy and would 
put at risk the lifp of persons on board if it were allowed to proceed to sea.
3.2 The lack of valid certificates (or the lack of Radiotelegraph Operator's Certificates or 
Radiotelephone Operator's Certificates) as required by the relevant Conventions, will constitute 
i>rima facie evidence that a ship may be sub-standard and will form the basis of a decision to 
detain the ship forthwith and to inspect it.
3.3 It is impracticable to define a sub-standard ship soJely by reference to a list of qualifying 
defects. The inspector will have to exercise his professional judgement to determine whether to 
detain the ship until the deficiencies are corrected or ..to allow it to sail with certain deficiencies 
which are not vital to the safety of the ship, its crew or passengers, haying regard to the 
particular circumstances of the intended voyage.
4 Submission of information to a port State about a sub-standard ship
4.1 Information that a ship appears to be sub-standard may be submitted to the appropriate 
authorities of the port State (see 4.4) by a member of crew, a professional body, an association, 
a trade union or any other individual with an interest in the safety of the ship, its crew and 
passengers. So far as the crew is concerned, it would be advisable that the submission should
be subscribed to by more than one member.
4.2 It is desirable that such information should be submitted in writing. This would permit 
proper documentation of the case and of the alleged deficiencies including the identification 
of the source of the information. When the information is passed verbally, it is preferable to 
require subsequently the filing of a written report, identifying for the purposes of the port State's 
records the individual or body providing the information.
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4.3 Information which may cause an investigation to be made should be submitted as early 
as possible after the arrival of the ship giving adequate time to the authorities to act as 
necessary.
4.4 Each Contracting Government should determine which authorities should receive 
information on sub-standard ships and initiate action. Measures should be taken to ensure that 
information submitted to the wrong department should be promptly passed on by such depart­
ment to the appropriate authority for action.
5 Action by port States in response to information about sub-standard ships
5.1 On receipt of information about a sub-standard ship, the authorities, after evaluating, in 
consultation with the master as appropriate, the seriousness of the information and the reliability 
of its source, should immediately investigate the matter and take the action required by the 
circumstances. Information judged by the authorities to be bona fide under the preseat 
procedures could constitute clear grounds for believing that the condition of the ship or its 
equipment does not correspond substantially with the particulars of the relevant certificates 
required by the applicable International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, or the 
International Convention on Load Lines, 1966, and the consequential need for inspection. Care 
should be taken to avoid any undue delay to the ship.
5.2 Authorities which receive information about a sub-standard ship which could give rise to 
intervention should forthwith notify any maritime, consular and/or diplomatic representatives 
of the flag State in the area of the ship and request thenh to initiate or co-operate with investiga­
tions. Likewise, the classification society which has issued the relevant cenificates on behalf of 
the flag State should be notified. These provisions will not, however, relieve the authorities of 
the Contracting Government of the port State from the responsibility for taking appropriate 
action in accordance with its powers under the relevant Conventions.
5.3 If the port State receiving information is unable to take action because there is insufficient 
time or no inspectors can be made available before the ship sails, the inform,ation should be 
passed to the authorities of the country of the next appropriate port of call, to the flag State and 
also to the relevant clessificatiop society in that port, where appropriate.
6 Procedures to be followed after exercise of control
6.1 The authorities of port States which have exercised control giving rise to interv'ention of 
any kind, whether or not as a result of information about a sub-standard ship, should forthwith 
notify any maritime, consular and/or diplomatic representatives of the flag State in the area of 
the ship of all the circumstances unless this is already done under 5.2. If such notification is made 
verbally, it should be subsequently confirmed, in writing. Likewise, the classification societies 
which have issued the relevant certificates on behalf of the flag State should be notified.
6.2 If the ship has been allowed to sail with known deficiencies, the authorities of the port 
State should communicate all the facts to the authorities of the country of the next appropriate 
port of call, to the flag State and to the relevant classification society, where appropriate. Lists of 
Addresses of Administrations to which the reports should be sent and of available inspection 
services are given in Appendix 3.
6.3 Contracting Governments, when they have exercised control giving rise to intervention of 
any kind, are urged to submit to the Organization repons in accordance with Regulation 19 of 
Chapter I of the applicable International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea or Article 21 of 
the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966. Such deficiency reports should be made in 
accordance v,^ith the form given in Appendix 2.
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6.4 Copies of deficiency repons made in accordance with paragraph 6.3 by Contracting 
Governments should, in addition to being forwarded to the Organization, be sent by the port 
State without delay to the authorities of the flag State and, where appropriate, to the 
classification society which had issued the relevant certificate. Deficiencies found which are not 
related to the applicable International Conventions for the Safety of Life at Sea, and the 
International Convention on Load Lines, 1966, should be submitted to flag States and/or to 
appropriate organizations but not to IMCO.
6.5 On receipt of such deficiency reports, the Administration of the flag State and/or, where 
appropriate, the classification society through that Administration, in addition to initiating any 
remedial action, is urged to forward comments to the Organization as soon as possible, preferably 
within three months after receipt. Such comments should be made in accordance with the form 
given in Appendix 2.
6.6 In the interest of making information regarding deficiencies and remedial measures generally 
available, a summar/ of such reports which have been received six months prior to every session 
of the Maritime Safety Committee should be prepared by the Secretariat, for consideration by 
the Maritime Safety Committee at every session, together with comments, if any, provided by 
the Administration of the flag State, which should include the reports of the classification 
society, if any. Copies of the reports should be circulated also to Contracting Governments 
which are not Members of IMCO.
6.7 In the summary of deficiency reports an indication should be given {flag State action) as
to whether a comment by the flag State concerned is outstanding (comment). Deficiency reports 
upon which expected flag State comments are outstanding shall be repeated in consecutive 
summaries of deficiency reports until such comments have been received. Before repeating such 
deficiency reports in subsequent summaries, the Secretariat should remind flag States concerned 
of any outstanding comments.
6.8 While Article 21 of the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966, does not provide for 
the submission of deficiency reports to the Organization, it is recommended that such reports 
should be made and submitted in accordance with the Procedures for the Control of Ships and 
the Guidelines on Control Procedures, where failure to comply with the convention requirements 
has led to an intervention by a port State.
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RESOLUTION A.542(13) Appendix II
Adopted on 17 November 1983 
Agenda item 12
PROCEDURES FOR THE CONTROL OF SHIPS AND DISCHARGES UNDER ANNEX I 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION OF POLLUTION
FROM SHIPS, 1973, AS MODIFIED BY 
THE PROTOCOL OF 1978 RELATING THERETO
THE ASSEMBLY.
RECALLING Article 16(j) of the Convention on the International Maritime Organization 
concerning the functions of the Assembly in relation to regulations concerning marine pollution,
RECALLING FURTHER that the Parties to the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto 
(MARPOL 73/78), have undertaken to give effect to its provisions in order to prevent the 
pollution of the marine environment by the discharge of, inter alia, oil or oily mixtures in 
contravention of that Convention,
RECALLING ALSO that it had adopted by resolution A.391 (X) Procedures for the Control 
of Discharges under the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea 
by Oil. 1954, as amended in 1962 and 1969,
REAFFIRMING its desire to ensure that ships comply at all times with the marine 
pollution standards prescribed by MARPOL 73/78,
NOTING that the provisions of MARPOL 73/78 relevant to the port State control of ships 
and discharges will be strengthened by the development of procedures to implement these 
provisions.
HAVING CONSIDERED the recommendation made by the Marine Environment 
Protection Committee at its eighteenth'session,
1. ADOPTS the Procedures for the Control of Ships and Discharges under Annex I of 
MARPOL 73/78 as set out in the Annex to this resolution which supersedes the Procedures 
contained in resolution A.39UX);
2. INVITES Member States and Parties to MARPOL 73/78 to implement the procedures and 
thereby to contribute towards the attainment of the objectives of that Convention;
3. REQUESTS Governments concerned to provide information on action taken in respect of 
ships found to be deficient in relation to MARPOL 73/78 in their role as either port or flag State 
administration;
4. FURTHER REQUESTS the Secretariat to collect and update when necessary the 
information referred to above for circulation to the Governments concerned;
5. REQUESTS ALSO the Marine Environment Protection Committee to continue its work 
onthis subjea v.^ith a view to improving the procedures further as may be necessary and to extend 
its work progressively to cover amendments to MARPOL 73/78 and experience gained from 




PROCEDURES FOR THE CONTROL OF SHIPS AND DISCHARGES UNDER ANNEX I 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION OF POLLUTION 
FROM SHIPS, 1973, AS MODIFIED BY 
THE PROTOCOL OF 1978 RELATING THERETO
PREAMBLE
1 The Parties to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships,
1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78) have undertaken 
to give effect to its provisions* in order to prevent the pollution of the marine environment 
by the discharge of.//7fera//a, oil or oily mixtures in contravention of that Convention.
2 The provisions cover the design and equipment of ships, the execution of surveys and 
inspections in order to ensure that the design and equipment comply with the relevant 
international standards and cover the operations of ships in so far as this concerns the protection 
of the marine environment.
3 The primary responsibility for securing that objective in relation to any particular ship 
rests with the Adrhinistration of the flag State. No attempt is made in this document to lay 
down guidelines for Administrations in this respect.
4 In some cases, and this applies especially to the operational provisions, it may be difficult 
for the Administration to exercise full and continuous control over some ships entitled to fly 
the flag of its State. Such ships for instance may not call regularly at ports or offshore terminals 
under the jurisdiction of the flag State.
5 The problem can be end has been overcome partly by appointing inspectors at foreign 
poas or authorizing dassificatiop societies to act on behalf of the flag State. In addition 
MARPOL 73/78 includes a number of provisions for States other than the flag State to
'exercise control over foreign ships visiting ports or offshore terminals under their jurisdiction. 
Guidelines, supplementary to these provisions, on specific control procedures have also been 
developed by the Organization. This document brings together the provisions and the guidelines 
for port and coastal State control referred to above.
6 Parties should make effective use of the opportunities that port State control provides 
for identifying deficiencies end substandard operations, if any, in visiting foreign ships which 
may render them pollution risks and for ensuring that remedial measures are taken. The purpose 
of these guidelines is to assist Parties to exercise effective port and coastal State control and 
thereby to contribute towards the attainment of the objectives of MARPOL 73/78.
7 Nothing in these guidelines should be construed as derogating from the powers of any 
Party to take measures within its jurisdiction in respect of any matter to which MARPOL 73/78 
relates or as extending the jurisdiction of any Party.
8 For the inspections carried out under these control procedures Article 7 of MARPOL 73/78 
applies in that:




All possible efforts shall be made to avoid a ship being unduly detained or delayed; 
and
when a ship is unduly detained or delayed by the control procedures it shall be entitled 
to compensation for any loss or damage suffered.
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SwedenUnited Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland hereinafter referred to as 
‘the Authorities'
Recalling the Final Declaration adopted on 2 December 1980 by the Regional 
European Conferanca on Maritime Safety which underlined the need to increase 
maritime safety and the protection of the marine environment and the 
importance of improving living and working conditions on board ship;
Noting with appreciation the progress achieved in these fields by the 
International Maritime Organization and the International Labour Organisation:
Noting also the contribution of the European Communities towards meeting the 
above mentioned objectives;
Mindful that the principal responsibility for the effective application of 
standards laid down in international instruments rests upon the authorities of the 
State whose flag a ship is entitled to fly:
Recognizing nevertheless that effective action by port States is required to 
prevent the operation of substandard ships;
Recognizing also the need to avoid distorting competition between ports:
Convinced of the necessity, for these purposes, of an improved and harmonized 
system of port state control and of strangthening cooperation and the exchange 
of information;
have reached the following understanding;
Section 1 Commitments
t.i Each Authority will give effect to the provisions of the present Memorandum and 
the Annexes thereto, which constitute an intagral part of the Memorandum.
t.2 Each Authority wilt maintain an effective system of port state control with a view 
to ensuring thaL without discrimination as to flag, (orsign marchant ships 
visiting tha ports of its Sute comply with the standards laid down in the relevant 
instruments as defined in section 2.
Each Authority will achisve. within a period of 3 years from the coming into 
effect of the Memorandum, an annual total of inspections corresponding to 25% 
of the estimated number of individual foreign merchant ships, hereinafter 
referred to as ‘ships', which entered the ports of its State during a recent 
representative period of 12 months.
1.4 Each Authority will consult, cooperate and exchange information with the other 
Authorities in order to further *ha aims of the-Memorandum.
origintl
tTtiiT" 2 Relevant Instruments
1.1 For the purposes of the Memorandum 'relevant instruments' are the following
instruments: ,aea.. the International Convention on Load Lines, 19oh<'
, the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974; .
the Protocol of 1978 relating to the International Convention for the Safety
of Life at Sea, 1974, ««,,*• ,__ cKin«. the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 
1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto, ^
. the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978;. the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions
. th^Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1976 (ILO 
Convention 147).
« With respect to the Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standwds) Convention, 1976 
(ILO Convention 147), each Authority will apply the standards specified in Annex
1.
« Each Authority will apply those relevant Instruments which are in force and to 
which its State is a Party. In the case of amendments to a relevant instrument 
each Authority will apply those amendments which are in force 
State has accepted. An instrument so amended will then be deemed to be tne 
'relevant instrument' for that Authority.
1.4 In applying a relevant instrument for the purposes of port state control, the 
Authorities will ensure that no more favourable treatment is given to ships 
entitled to fly the flag of a State which is not a Party to that instrument.
Ij In the case of ships below 500 tons gross tonnage the Authorities will •PP'y
those requirements of the relevant instruments which are applicable and will to 
the extent thet a relevant instrument does not apply take such action as may be 
necessary to ensure that those ships are not clearly hazardous to safety, health 
or the environmenL having regard in particular to Annex 1.
Section 3 Inspection Procedures Rectification and Detention
1.1 In fullfilling their commitments the Authorities will carry out inspections, which 
will consist of s visit on board a ship in order to check the certificates and 
documents relevant for the purposes of the Memorandum. In the absence of 
valid certificates or documents or if there are clear grounds for believing that the 
ship does not substantially meet the requirements of a reievant instrument, a 
more detailed inspection wiil be carried out Inspections will be carried out in 
accordance with Annex 1.
The Authorities will regard as 'clear grounds' intor a//a the following:
. a report or notification by another Authority;
a report or complaint by the master, a crow member, or any person or 
organization with a legitimate interest in the safe operation of the ship, 
shipboard living and working conditions or the prevention of pollution, 
unless the Authority concerned deems the report or complaint to be
manifestly unfounded; . . *. other indications of sarious deficiancies, having regard in particular to
Annex 1.
In selecting ships for inspection, the Authorities will pay special attention to;
• ships which may present a speciai hazard, for instance oil tankers and gas 
and chemical carriers;
I ships which have had several recent deficiencies.
The Authorities will seek to avoid inspecting ships which have been inspMted by 
any of the other Authorities within the previous six months, unless they have 
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3.S Inspections will be carried out by properly qualified persons authoriied for that 
purpose by the Authority concerned and acting under its responsibility.
3.S Each Authority will endeavour to secure the rectification of deficiencies detected.
J.7 In the case of deficiencies which are clearly hazardous to safety, health or the
environment, the Authority will, except as provided in 3.8, ensure that the 
hazard is removed before the ship is allowed to proceed to sea and for this 
purpose will taka appropriate action, which may include detecition. The Authority 
will, as soon as possible, notify the flag State through its consul or, in his 
absence, its nearest diplomatic representative or its maritime authority of the 
action taken. Where the certifying authority is an organization other than a 
maritima administration, the former will also be advised.
S.t Where deficiencies referred to in 3.7. cannot be remedied in the port of
inspection, the Authority may allow the ship to proceed to another port, subject 
to any appropriate conditions determined by that Authority with a view to 
. ensuring that the ship can so proceed without unreasonable danger to Mfety, 
health or the environment. In such circumstances the Authority will notify the 
competent authority of the region State where the next port of call of the ship is 
situated, the parties mentioned in 3.7. and any other authority as appropriate. 
Notification to Authorities will be made in accordance with Annex 2. The 
Authority receiving such notification will inform the notifying Authority of action 
taken.
3.1 The provisions of section 3.7. and 3.8. are without prejudice to the requirernents 
of relevant instruments or procedures established by international organizations 
concerning notification and reporting procedures related to port state control.
3.11 The Authorities will ensure that, on the conclusion of an inspection, the master 
of the ship is provided with a document, in the form specified in Annex 3, giving 
the results of the inspection and details of any action taken.
When exercising control under the Memorandum, the Authorities will make all 
posssibie efforts to avoid unduly detaining or delaying a ship. Nothing in the 
Memorandum affects rights created by provisions of relevant instruments 
relating to compensation for undue detention or delay.
Section 4 Provision of information
Each Authority will report on its inspections under the Memorandum and their 
results, in accordance with the procedures specified in Annex 4.
Section 5 Operational Violations
The Authorities will upon the request of another Authority, endeavour to secure 
evidence relating to suspected violations of the requirements on operational 
matters of Rule 10 of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at 
Sea, 1972 and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships. 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978, relating thereto. In case of 
suspected violations Involving the discharge of harmful substances, an Authority 
will, upon the request of another Authority, visit in port the ship suspected of 
such a violation in order to obtain information and where appropriate to take a 
sample of any alleged pollutant.
Section 6 Organization
l.t A Committee will be established, composed of a representative of each of the 
Authorities and of the Commission of the European Communities. An observer 
from Mch of the International Maritime Organization and the international 
Labour Organisation will be invited to participate in the work of the Committee.
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1.3 The Committee will:. carry out the specific tasks assigned to it under the Memorandum:
. promote by all means necessary, including seminars for surveyors, the 
harmonization of procedures and practices relating to inspection, 
rectification, detention and the application of 2.4.;
. develop and review guidelines for carrying out inspections under the 
Memorandum;. develop and review procedures for the exchange of information;
. keep under review other matters relating to the operation and the 
effectiveness of the Memorandum.
■.4 A secretariat provided by the Netherlands' Ministry of Transport and Public 
Works will be set up and will have its office in The Hague.
I.S The secretariat, acting under the guidance of the Committee and within the 
limits of the resources made available to it, will:
. prepare meetings, circulate papers and provide such assistance as may be 
required to enable the Committee to carry out its functions;
. facilitate the exchange of information, carry out the procedures outlined in 
Annex 4 and prepare reports as may be necessary for the purposes of the 
Memorandum;. carry out such other work as may be necessary to ensure the effective 
operation of the Memorandum.
Section 7 Amendments
7.t Any Authority may propose amendments to the Memorandum.
7.2 In the case of proposed amendments to sections of the Memorandum the 
following procedure will apply:a the proposed amendment will be submitted through the secretariat for 
consideration by the Committee;
I amendments will be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the
representatives of the Authorities present and voting in the Comrnittee. If 
so adopted an amendment will be communicated by the secretariat to the 
Authorities for acceptance;a an amendment will be deemed to have been accepted either at the end of 
a period of six months after adoption by the representatives of the 
Authorities in the Committee or at the end of any different period 
determined unanimously by the representatives of the Authorities in the 
Committee at the time of adoption, unless within the relevant period an 
objection is communicated to the secretariat by an Authority;
4 an amendment will take effect 60 days after it has been accepted or at the 
end of any different period determined unanimously by the representatives 
of the Authorities in the Committee.
7.3 fn the case of proposed amendments to Annexes of the Memorandum the
following procedure will apply: .• the proposed amendment will be submitted through the secretariat for 
consideration by the Authorities:
» the amendment will be deemed to have been accepted at the end of a
period of three months from the date on which it has been communicated 
by the secretariat unless an Authority requests in writing that the 
amendment should be considered by the Committee. In the latter case the 
procedure specified in 7.2. will apply;
■ the amendment will take effect 60 days after it has been accepted or at
the end of any different period determined unanimously by the Authorities.
Section 8
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t.2 A Maritime Authority of another State may, with the consent of the Authorities 
participating in the Memorandum, adhere to the Memorandum. For such an 
Authority the Memorandum will take effect upon such date as may be mutually 
agreed.
1.3 When the Memorandum takes effect, it will supersede the 'Memorandum of 
Understanding between Certain Maritime Authorities on the Maintenance of 
Standards on Merchant Ships’, signed at The Hague on 2 March 1978.
1.4 The Memorandum will take effect on 1 July 1982.
I.i The English and French versions of the text of the Memorandum are equally
authentic.
Signed at PARIS in the English and French languages.
this twenty-sixth day of January one thousand nine hundred and eighty-two.
Appendix IV
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Appendix V (.i)DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
U.S. COAST GUARD 




CALL SIGN:_______________ GT:YEAR BUILT:FLAG:







. U.S. POLLUTION 
PREVENTION REGS
CERTIFICATES
Deficiency Description Deficiency Action Taken






Copy delivered to:__________ 
(Masttr/Most Printed Some) (Position)
Boarding
Officer. ______ _________________________________ 
(Printed Some) * * * (Sitnature)
rjr.T
Unit Name and ; . . -
Address r:-• ■ ■ ^






U.S. COAST GUARD 
CG-5438 (9-66)
FOREIGN FREIGHT VESSEL EXAMINATION
VESSEL NAME:
*1
V 1 N • CALL SIGN:*
FLAG: SERVICE: *
NATIONAL GROSS TONS: ’ VESSEL USE:*
NET TONS: * REGISTERED LENGTH:*
DEADWEIGHT TONS: * .PROPULSION TYPE:*
BUILD DATE:*




PS OASF U BOARDING TYPE: EXM - MOM









SHIP’S OFFICER ACCOMPANYING BOARDING OFFICER (NAME/TITLE)







ISSUING ISSUE ISSUE DATE
AGENCY PORT DATE EXPIRES
Cert, of Financial Reap.
(33 CFR 130-132)
Cert. #(s) USCG miiiiiiiiimi
USCG iiiniiiiiiiiiii
SOLAS Safety Construction
Cert. (SOLAS Rea. 12 Ch. 1)
SOLAS Safety Equipment
Cert. (SOLAS Rea. 12 Ch. I)
SOLAS Safety
Radiotelephone Cert.




(SOLAS Rep. 12 Ch. 1)
iOPP Cert, or Equivalent 
with FoVm A or
Form B (check one).







1. Loadilne Is not submerged (46 CFR 42.07-10)
2. No pollution evident alongside ‘i
.3. No significant hull damage evident
.4. ---------------------------------------------------------^:.................................. ............... .......
.5. __ ____ ________ —............................................................................................. ............
C. NAVIGATION SAFETY
1. Current charts for the port (33 CFR 164.33(a)(1)). List local charts carried or their foreign equivalent: 
Chart # Edition #/Date Issuing Agency
2. Publications are current and corrected up-to-date (33 CFR 164.33):
_ a. U.S. Coast Pilot
_ b. Coast Guard Light List
_ c. Tide Tables 
_ d. Tidal Current Tables
3. Pre-arrival tests required by 33 CFR 164.25 were conducted and logged (33 CFR 164.11(q)) 
Y. Nav
90
Following equipment is on board and operable (have Energized if possible);
NOTE
ENERGIZING TRANSMITTING EQUIPMENT DURING CERTAIN 
CARGO OPERATIONS COULD POSE A HAZARD
a. Marine Radar (33 CFR 164.35(a))
b. Illuminated Magnetic Steering Compass (33 CFR 164.35(b))
c. Current Deviation Table or compass comparison record for magnetic compass, in 
wheelhouse (33 CFR 164.35(c))
d. Gyrocompass (33 CFR 164.35(d))
e. Illuminated Gyrocompass repeater at main steering stand (33 CFR 164.35(e))
f. Illuminated Rudder Angle Indicator (33 CFR 164.35(f))
g. Maneuvering fact sheet displayed prominently in wheelhouse (33 CFR 164.35(g)) 
containing:
(1) Port & Starboard turning circle diagrams for 90 degree turns
(2) Time & distance to stop from full & half speeds , ,
(3) Table of shaft revolutions for representative speeds
OR
Table of control settings'for representative speeds
“T'
_ (4) Table of speeds at which bow thruster is effective 
_ (5) Maneuvering information for normal load and normal ballast condition for:
___ (a) cairn weather
___ (b) no current
___(c) deep water conditions
___ (d) clean hull
_ (6) Warning statement at bottom of maneuvering fact sheet
h. Echo Depth Sounding device (33 CFR 164.35(h))
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_ I. Continuous recorder for Echo Depth Sounder (33 CFR 164.35(i))
_ J. Relative Motion Plotting Equipment (33 CFR 164.35(j))
_ k. Block diagram operating instructions for steering gear change-over (33 CFR 164.35(k))
_ f. Centerline RPM indicator for each propeller (33 CFR 164.35(1))
_ m. Centerline Indicator shov/ing pitch and operationai mode of each controllable pitch propeller 
(33 CFR 164.35(m))
_ n. Centerline indicator showing direction and amount of thrust of each lateral thrust propeller 
(33 CFR 164.35(n)) - - .... ............
5. Two independent radars on vessels over 10,000 GT (33 CFR 164.37)
6. Labeled ARPA (33 CFR 164.38(b)) ■ • . .
7. Electronic Position Fixing Device (33 CFR 164.41) " ■ -
8. All equipment failures have been reported to COTP (33 CFR 164.53(b))
9. Radiotelephone with 156.65 MHz (Ch. 13) VHF-FM capability (33 CFR 26.03)
10. 
11.  
D. PACKAGED HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
r
1. Obtain a copy of the Dangerous Cargo Manifest (DCM) from the vessel’s master or mate for 




2. Check the DCM for compliance with the requirements in 49 CFR 176.30:
_ a. No un-regulated materials listed (49 CFR 176.30(a))
_ b. Contains vessel name and official number (or call sign) (49 CFR 176.30(a)(1))
_ c. Contains nationality of vessel (49 CFR 176.30(a)(2))
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___ d. Contains stowage location of each material listed (49 CFR 176.30(a)(7))
___ e. Contains signature of preparer and date (49 CFR 176.30(b))
___ f. Contains signature of master or licensed deck officer (49 CFR 176.30(c))
___ g. Copy of all authorized exemptions are with DCM (49 CFR 176.31)
___ 3. Check several items on the DCM for compliance with 49 CFR 172.101 or the IMDG Code, as
applicable:
___  a. Proper shipping name and Identification number (49 CFR 176.30(a)(3))
___  b. Number and description of packages and gross weight for each type of packaging (49 CFR
176.30(a)(4))
___ c. Hazard class (49 CFR 176.30(a)(5))
___4. Check the cargo segregation, as listed on the DCM or stow plan, for compliance with the
requirements in 49 CFR 176.80 - 176.83
___5. Check several items on the DCM for compliance with the detailed requirements in 49 CFR 176
___6. Check several items on the DCM for compliance with the packaging requirements in
49 CFR 173
___1. If Class A commercial or military explosives are present, check for required permit fordesignated dangerous cargo or freight container approval, if applicable (49 CFR 176.76(a) and 
176.100)
___8.‘ With a ship’s officer, check the cargo in the holds and/or on deck for compliance with the
stowage plan. Do not limit yourself to cargoes listed in the DCM. Be alert for:
___ a. improperly marked or labeled packages (49 CFR 172.300-.450)
___ b. improperly placarded freight containers or portable tanks (49 CFR 172.500-.558)
___ c. labeled or placarded cargoes not listed on the DCM (49 CFR 176.30(a)(3))
___ d. leaking containers or packages (49 CFR 176.50)
___ e. no licensed officer supervising cargo operations (49 CFR 176.57)
___ f. break bulk hazardous materials not stowed lAW 40 CFR 176.74
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_ Q. “No Smoking” signs properly posted (49 CFR 176.60)
, 9.____ _________________----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - ----------
10. __________ _________________ ______________________________
NOTE
IF BUNKERING OR OTHER OIL TRANSFER OPERATIONS ARE TAKING PLACE.
CONDUCT A MONITOR OF THE TRANSFER
E. POLLUTION PREVENTION
1. Fuel Oil/Bulk lube oil discharge containment of sufficient capacity (33 CFR 155.320)
2. Ballast water not carried in fuel tanks (new oceangoing ships 4000 GT and above)
(33 CFR 155.440)
_3. Pollution placard properly posted (33 CFR 155.450)
_4. No oil forward of collision bulkhead (33 CFR 155.470)
_5. Oil Transfer Procedures are legible, in a language understood by the crew, and posted or 
available (33 CFR 155.740)
_6. 'Oil Transfer Procedures contain the information required by 33 CFR 155.750, including:
a List of each product transferred by the vessel, including the generic or chemical name 
’ (33 CFR I55.750(a)(l)(i))
___ b. Description of each oil transfer system on the vessel, including;
___ (1) line diagram of transfer piping including each valve, pump, control device, vent and
overflow (33 CFR 155.750(a)(2)(i)
___ (2) location of shutoff valves that separate bilge or ballast systems from oil transfer
system (33 CFR I55.750(a)(2)(ii))
___ (3) description of and procedures for emptying manifold containment
(33 CFR 155.750(a)(2)(iii))
___ c. Number of persons required to be on duty during oil transfer operations (33 CFR 155.750 (a)(3))
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d Duties by title of each officer, person in charge, tankerman, deckhand, and any other 
’ person required for oil transfer operations (33 CFR 155.750(a)(4))
e. Procedures and duty assignments for tending moorings during oil transfers 
* (33 CFR 155.750(a)(5))
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f. Procedures for operating the means of communications (33 CFR 155.750(a)(6))
g. Procedures for topping off tanks (33 CFR 155.750(a)(7))
h Procedures for ensuring all valves used during oil transfer are closed upon completion of 
' the transfer (33 CFR 155.750(a)(8))
I. Procedures for reporting oil discharges into the water (33 CFR 155.750(a)(9)) 
i. Exemptions or alternatives which have been granted are included (33 CFR 155.750(b) 
k. Amendments to oil transfer procedures incorporated (33 CFR 155.750(c))
Sufficient deck lighting, shielded as necessary (33 CFR 155.790)
Records available for inspection (33 CFR 155.820);
a. Name of each person in charge (33 CFR 155.820(a))'
b. Signed copies of Declarations of Inspection for past month (33 CFR 155.820(d))
Oil Record Book (ORB) (33 CFR 151.25);
a. ORB on board and available for inspection (33 CFR 151.25(i))
b. Part I (Machinery Space Operations) aboard (33 CFR 151.25(a))
c. Each operation signed by person in charge (33 CFR 151.25(h))
d. Each completed page signed by master (33 CFR 151.25(h))
e. ORB maintained on board for 3 years (33 CFR 151.25(k)) •
f. Last disposal of oily wastes (33 CFR 151.25(d));




___ (2) To reception facility: Date_______
Location: _I
Amount _
_ g. Recorded discharges are lAW 33 CFR 151.09 '
10. Compare ORB to most recent bilge monitor continuous discharge record for unauthorized 
discharges (33 CFR 151.09)
11. Vessel has an operable and labelled MSD on board (33 CFR 159.7)
12. Bilge monitor continuous discharge record retained on board for 3 years (33 CFR 155.370(d))
13. _;-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. _______________ ^
F. BULK SOLID HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
1. Shipping papers complete:
_ a. Shipping name & Hazard class (46 CFR 148.02*1 (a)(1))
_ b. Quantity to be transported (46 CFR 148.02-1 (a)(2))
_ c. Name & address of U.S. shipper (46 CFR 148.02*1 (a)(3))
_ d. Certification Statement (46 CFR 148.02*1 (a)(4))
_ e. Special Permit on board (if hazardous material not listed in 46 CFR 148.01*7 is being carried)
2. Dangerous Cargo Manifest on board and complete (46 CFR 148.02-3(a)):
_ a. Name and official number of the vessel (46 CFR 148.02*3(a)(1))
_ b. Nationality of the vessel (46 CFR 148.02-3(a)(2))
_ c. Proper name of the hazardous material (46 CFR 148.02*3(a)(3)) .
_ d. HoId(s) in which the material is transported (46 CFR 148.02*3(a)(4))
_ e. Quantity of material in each hold (46 CFR 148.02*3(a)(5))
_ f. Signature of Master or authorized representative (46 CFR 148.02*3(a)(5))
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3. Cargo inspections carried out and logged (46 CFR 148.03-7)
4. Stowage conditions observed (46 CFR 148.03-11)
5. Special Additional Requirements complied with (46 CFR 148.04)
6. Additional requirements of special permit complied with (46 CFR 148.01-11)
7. _
8. 
G. FOLLOW-UP ACTION BY BOARDING OFFICER
1. Standard Boarding Report (CG-5437) issued.
2. Discrepancies corrected during boarding. Note page numbers of exceptions opposite
3. Significant vessei damage brought to the attention of a marine inspector or investigating 
officer
4. Vessel operations suspended
5. Vessel detained
6. COTP order No.issued. (Describe opposite)
7. Appropriate MSIS product(s) updated
8. ^ Work hours expended for this exam:
Travei time:________________ Training hours:
Time On: Time Off:
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tti'e undersigned, o.c. kanrstra
duly authorized officer of the netherlands shipping inspectorate 
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has been detained in accordance with the provisions of section 
21 of the prevention of pollution -^rom ships act (official 
collection 1°n3, no. 653) 
on account of:
- danger to the marine environment 
in accordance with the provisions of
section 23 of the nreventicn of pollution from shirs act 
it i c r:Ot nermitted "^cr t*^e shir to c’^oceeri to sea,
rctterdam, the 9ih of february
the.above mentioned officer,
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253/7 dcsrr.r nL
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the undersigned, p.c. karrstra
duly authorized officer of the necherlands shipping insoectorate 
in the district i/ii at rotterdarr., herewith notifies you that the 
detention of the:
Toaster :
of which you were inforr-'ed by ’notice of detention’ dated the 
9th of february 1??0 has been raised.
rotterda?^, the 11th of february 1??0
the above mentioned officer,
w.s. o.c. kan-.stra














CRUbE OIL TANKER - 
Active and Trading 
125,249 Net Tons.... 







103,664 From Flag.. ???7 
3/30/77 STK Reason.





702 Building Yard Data
703 Minimum Safe Manning
704 Deadweight Tonnage
End of Line #'s
General Information--------------
+100A1+LMC UMStOlL TANKER) 
X CATTLEYA(87).
HYUNDAI HI ULSAN «7412. 
0751 SCH. 1
267807 DWT . . -..........
LRS
Roll Keys = Display Lines ENTER = Reselect 
CMD 2 = Certificate Data CMD 5 = Inspections
,CMD 1 = Next Vessel 






Type..............................  CRUDE OIL TANKER
Operation Code... Active and Trading
Gross Tons................ 125,249 Net Tons....
Mo/Yr Built............. 03 / 77 Registered..











Engine Power kw.. 26,4S!0 Satellite ... Radio Exp. 06/30/9;
Ln# Line Title-------------------- Remarks------------------------- - Type Surv/Exp Validity SCY
715 Tonnage Certificate LRS
717 lOPP annex I P012S9 FT 12/23/90 09/23/92 LRS
720 Load Line P012S9 FT 12/23/90 09/23/92 LRS
725 Radiotelegraph P09S9 FT OS/17/90 08/17/90 LRS
735 Construction P012S9 FT--12/23/90 09/23/92 LRS
745 C L C Oil Pollution #15263 IS 02/20/91
750 Safety Equipment P09S9 FT 11/17/90 08/17/91 LRS
End of Line #'s ... ...
Roll Keys = Display Lines ENTER = Reselect CMD 1 = Next Vessel











CRUtiE OIL TANKER .
Active and Trading
125,249 Net Tons...............







103,664 From Flag.. ???? 
3/30/77 STK Reason.
3/04/88 STK Date.. 00/00/00
Radio Exp. 06/30/92
Ln# Line Title--------------- Place----------
787 Inspection/Survey Re REACTIVATE
787 Inspection/Suryey Re SINGAPORE
787 Inspection/Survey Re JOHORE
788 Inspection/Survey Re
788 I nspection/Survey Re SINGAPORE
789 Inspect!on/Survey Re
789 Inspection/Survey Re SINGAPORE
790 Inspection/Survey Re ROTTERDAM
End of Line S
Date-------- Remarks----------------- ------------ SCY
08/04/87
09/20/87 IN INL
09/23/87 SV 000005 LRS
09/14/88 SV 000005 LRS
12/06/88 IN
08/18/89 SV 172035 LRS
12/19/89 IN
02/09/90 P. S. DETENTION - POLLUTION TX
Roll Keys = Display Lines .ENTER « Reselect CMD 1 = Next Vessel..
CMD 2 » Certificate Data CMD 3 = General Info. CMD 7 = End of Job
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